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Introduction
1 Like dissident journalists, writers, and artists, the persecution of dissident academics
by governments has been a common issue since the beginning of modern times. Raison
d’état has frequently judged it necessary to conduct purges in universities, particularly
in times of crisis and transition. In the case of Turkey, as a late industrialized country
with feeble and dependent democratic institutions, this “national interest” argument
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seems  to  come  into  play  more  frequently,  feeding  the  idea  that  “the  history  of
universities in Turkey is nothing but a history of purges” (Günal 2013). 
2 A bird’s-eye view of Turkey’s previous academic purges provides strong arguments to
show  the  relationship  between  academic  purges  and  transitions  in  capital
accumulation regimes and related changes in the power bloc of the country. The first
academic purge happened in the wake of the 1929 Great Depression. In that period,
Turkey  underwent  a  transition  from liberal  to  dirigiste economy that,  in  1933,  was
accompanied by a university reform entailing a sweeping “anti-liberal” purge at the
Darülfünun,  which  was  the  only  autonomous  modern  academic  institution  of  the
country as of that time (Ege; Hagemann 2012; Mazıcı 1995; Zürcher 2017). The second
academic purge took place in 1948 when a liberal, outward-facing economic policy was
substituted for the dirigiste interventionism that had been in force during the interwar
period (Boratav 1998: 93–96). As Turkey’s dominant classes had decided to realign with
the Western bloc in the post-WWII world and, in parallel with the rise of McCarthyism
in the US, an “anti-communist” purge cleaned out the Faculty of Language, History,
Geography at Ankara University in 1948 (for a detailed analysis, see Çetik 2008). The
timing of the third academic purge in the country corresponded to the aftermath of the
1960  military  coup  d’état,  which  institutionally  implanted  the  import  substitution
industrialization model in the economy and its triumvirate power bloc on a political
level (Parla 1998). This period of transition led to a new wave of purge in universities,
which has  later  come to  be  known as  the  “incident  of  the  147s”  (see  Alkan 2017).
Finally, a fourth purge happened following the military coup d’état of 1980, which has
been taken as the starting point of neoliberalization process in Turkey. This round of
academic  purge  occurred  in  1983  based  on  post-coup  Martial  Code  No.  14021.
Throughout this colorful history of purges in modern Turkey, hundreds of academics
lost their jobs: in 1933, with the abolition of the Darülfünun, two-thirds of its academic
staff (approximately 100 scholars), in 1948 five brilliant academics in the social sciences
and humanities, in 1960 a total of 147 academics, and in 1983, according to different
sources, 73 to 117 academics were temporarily or definitely dismissed (Ulusoy; Bora
2019). 
3 The last purge in Turkey’s universities, including that of the Academics for Peace (AfP),
seems to follow a similar pattern in the sense of having been one of the outputs of a
serious economic and political crisis. Between 2002 and 2007, Turkey’s economy grew
at an annual rate of 7.2% and the country performed relatively well throughout the
global  financial  crisis.  In  2012,  however,  Turkey’s  rate  of  economic  growth sharply
slowed down to 2.2% (Jarosiewicz 2013; Peker; Camdemir 2013). The country’s GDP per
capita steadily decreased from $12,519 in 2013 to $9,042 in 2019 (GDP per Capita (Current
US$) - Turkey | Data, 2020). From a mainstream institutionalist point of view, the end of
economic growth in the post-2007 epoch is related to the breakdown of the economic
and political institutional reforms and the EU-Turkey membership talks that had been
simultaneously carried out after 2002 (Acemoglu; Ucer 2014). For this kind of approach,
the authoritarian drift in Turkey and academic purge as one of its symptoms can be
interpreted  as  consequences  of  the  AKP government’s  withdrawal  from democratic
institutional  reforms.  However,  another  point  of  view,  particularly  a  Marxist  one,
stresses  the  precedence  of  economic  factors.  More  precisely,  this  position  sees  the
authoritarian drift  in  Turkey  as  a  rapidly  evolving  phenomenon  following  the
aforementioned economic slowdown in 2012, rather than a consequence of interrupted
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institutional reforms. For example, according to economist Ümit Akçay, “after 2012 ... a
slowdown in economic growth unleashed a new series of conflicts ... within the new
political establishment, between AKP and the Gülenists, and ended with the failed coup
attempt in 2016” (Akçay 2018: 16). Conflicts within the state due to a deadlock in the
existing accumulation regime and its dominant ideology, and the pursuit of a certain
restauration are important to understand our case, because, as İzge Günal highlights,
academic purges in Turkey are generally related to the intra-dominant class battles and
occur as “manifestations of a concern about the restoration of the dominant ideology”
(Günal 2013: 121–122).
4 No matter which explanation is adopted, it is evident that the AfP case occurred in a
context where troublesome economic stagnation was accompanied by severe battles
within  the  state  between  ultra-nationalists,  including  those  with  pro-Eurasian
tendencies, and the Gülenists2, which prepared the way for a “coup within a coup” on
July 15, 20163. One can interpret these battles within the state, with reference to the
analysis of Yahya Madra and Sedat Yılmaz, as convulsions of transition from populist
neoliberalism towards corporate nationalism (Madra; Yılmaz 2019), or to Ian Bruff as
symptoms  of  the  rise  of  authoritarian  neoliberalism  (Bruff  2014).  The  current
authoritarian drift would be considered as either the death agony or the resurfacing of
a constituent part of neoliberalism. No matter which one of these explanations deems
to be true, it is clear that the neoliberal “centaur state’s” (Wacquant 2010) paternalistic
and authoritarian body has gradually prevailed over its “liberal head” in Turkey in the
last decade and declared its triumph after the 15 July incident, throughout the two-year
long state of emergency. 
5 The AfP purge started rather randomly with the aim of criminalizing and terrorizing
signatories just after a petition was put into circulation on January 11, 20164. However,
it is important to emphasize that this process gained a more systematic and sweeping
character with the post-July 15 state of  emergency.  While  the number of  signatory
academics who had lost their job by dismissals, forced resignations, or retirements was
about 50 as of May 30, 2016 (HRFT Academy 2019: 12), this number escalated to 549 in
the post-July 15 period (Academics for Peace 2020). Furthermore, the difference before
and  after  July  15  was  not  only  quantitative  but  also  qualitative.  The  dismissal  by
executive decree, which was one of the most distinguishing features of the post-July 15
period, is considered as a “gross violation of human rights” (Körükmez et al. 2019) and
a  “civic  death,”  leading  to  the  complete  exclusion  of  the  ousted  academics  from
economic, social, and political life (Sertdemir Özdemir; Özyürek 2019). 
6 The pattern of the last academic purge is similar to previous ones in terms of being
linked  to  and  motivated  by  transitions  in  the  capital  accumulation  regime  and
associated changes in the power bloc;  nevertheless,  this  last  wave has been clearly
more devastating than others. Why did the new power bloc of the post-July 15 period
act so far-reaching as it was stretching out its muscles as a show of strength against
academics?  Would  a  symbolic  purge,  like  that  of  1948  in  the  Faculty  of  Language,
History, and Geography, have not sufficed to restore the dominant ideology according
the priorities of the new power bloc? 
7 The last purge has not targeted academics only. During the state of emergency, at least
125.678  public  servants  have  been  dismissed  and  banned  from public  service
(“Olağanüstü  Hal  İşlemleri  İnceleme  Komisyonu  Kararları  Hakkında  Duyuru
(02.10.2020)” 2020). Seçkin Sertdemir Özdemir and Esra Özyürek made the claim that
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the extremity of the response has its roots in  the rise of necropolitics, or the politics of
death, which has come to the forefront together with “new authoritarianism” as a form
of  governmentality  (Sertdemir  Özdemir;  Özyürek  2019).  This  argument  is  globally
relevant in clarifying the distinctive logic of the last purge with respect to the use of
power techniques. However, this approach does not sufficiently take into account the
particularity  of  the  university  as  a  structural  whole  with  its  own  transformations,
internal  tensions,  and  conflicts,  and  as  a  specific  field  of  implementation  of  both
necropolitics and neoliberal transformations. A special focus on the university might
allow revealing the heterogeneous and stratified, even contradictory, structure of the
category of persecuted and/or purged academics, and also putting the last purge in
Turkey in the context of the ongoing crisis of higher education and academic freedom
across the world. 
8 This is what this article aims to explore through the case of the AfP in Turkey. What are
the various profiles of the purged academics in Turkey? Which political, ideological,
and economic dynamics have had impacts on the making of these heterogeneous and
inequality-charged  academic  profiles?  What  impact  has  the  global  crisis  of  the
university had on these academics before and after the purge? How were the post-
purge strategies of the persecuted academics and their collegial solidarity networks
abroad affected by the crisis of the university? To what extent have the international
solidarity initiatives that were launched for at-risk scholars, especially the Peace letter
signatories, been successful in addressing the problems of those academics? Finally, to
what extent has necropolitical violence against dissident academics been intermingled
with the neoliberal restructuration of the university? 
9 In response to these questions, as a persecuted and prosecuted yet not expelled Peace
letter signatory5, I develop an analysis based on my own trajectory and experiences in
this period. A database collectively generated by AfP volunteers during the prosecution
process  and a  limited sample  of  interviews with initiators  or  contributors  of  three
ventures (the PAUSE Program in France, the New University in Exile Consortium in the
US, and Off-University in Germany) are also utilized. In this way, this study attempts to
understand the limits and potential capacities of such ventures to overcome neoliberal
brutality that is inclined to take a necropolitical form in hybrid regimes, and to which
marginalized  academics  especially  from  non-market-friendly  disciplines  of  the
humanities and social sciences are exposed. 
10 Before examining these initiatives of  academic solidarity and resistance against the
anti-democratic  turn  in  the  world-political  trajectory  (albeit  mostly  by  resisting
authoritarianism rather than neoliberalism), it will be helpful to take a closer look at
the most recent academic purge6 with a special  focus on transformations of  higher
education  in  Turkey.  This  may  provide  an  understanding  of  not  only  the
interconnection between the purge of the AfP and the neoliberal restructuration of the
university, but also the negative impacts of the latter on the aforementioned initiatives
and their ability to achieve their objectives. 
 
Spatial, Disciplinary and Ideological Distinctions
Between Purged Academics 
11 The last academic purge in Turkey targeted mainly two groups: left-leaning academics,
primarily including AfP signatories, and right-leaning academics allegedly related to
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the  Gülen movement.  The profiles  of  the  first  group,  who constitute  a  minority  of
approximately  10%  among  all  purged  academics,  and  those  of  the  right-leaning
majority have little  similarity between them7.  Composed largely by junior or  early-
career scholars who are mostly specialized in social sciences and humanities, the first
group was purged mainly from public and private universities in metropolitan areas. In
turn,  the  purge  of  the  second group mainly  besieged  provincial  universities,8 even
targeted  a  large  number  of  acting  and  former  university  presidents  and  other
executives,  and  composed  principally  by  academics  specialized  on  STEM  (Sciences,
technologies, engineering and mathematics). This work is mainly focused on gathering
information on the AfP. However, the widespread presence of right leaning Gülenist
academics in Turkey’s universities before the July 15 incident and also their massive
purge under Turkey’s state of emergency rule from July 2016 to July 2018 needs to be
touched upon briefly. 
12 Whether a part of any entryist organization or not, one can roughly depict the profile of
Gülenist  academics  as  moderately  statist  and  nationalist  Muslim,  usually  with  an
uncritical  stance  towards  both  neoliberalism  and  authoritarianism.  Furthermore,
referred to as “Weberian Islamists” by some scholars (Keskin 2012), a competitive spirit
has always been encouraged in and by Gülenist circles (Özdalga 2000).  In short,  the
great majority of the purged allegedly Gülenist academics were not known as dissidents
in their universities and, due to this, at the time of their prosecution a considerable
number  of  them  were  holding  executive  positions  in  these  universities9.  Another
distinctive aspect of those who were purged on charges of affiliation with the Gülenist
circles is that they were mostly employed in provincial universities (taşra üniversiteleri),
which can be  considered “second-rate” or  “backwater” universities  in  the Turkey’s
context10.
 
Massification of Higher Education as “Provincialization” of the
University
13 In fact, Turkey has become one of the developing countries making significant leaps of
progress,  in  line  with  the  global  trend  of  the  neoliberal  massification  of  higher
education.  The  gross  enrollment  ratio  of  students  in  higher  education  institutions
(within  the  total  population  of  the  five-year  age  group continuing  from secondary
school) was under 10% in 1970 in Turkey and had reached only 20% in 1994. In the wake
of the AKP-led neoliberal reforms of the 2000s, this figure leaped forward to 94.7% in
2015  (Turkey  -  Gross  Enrolment  Ratio  in  Tertiary  Education,  2020).  As  a  result,  in  the
2018-2019  academic  year,  7,740,502  students  were  enrolled  in  higher  education
institutions  (Yükseköğretim  Bilgi  Yönetim  Sistemi,  n.d.),  while  this  figure  was  only
2,868,222 in Germany (Statista 2020), whose population is approximately equivalent to
that of Turkey. An increase in the number of universities comes forward as another
consequence of the massification of higher education, with a rise from 53 in 1994 to 73
in 2004 and to 204 in 2020 (Gunay; Gunay 2011; Tekneci 2016; “Yükseköğretim Bilgi
Yönetim Sistemi” n.d.). 
14 Philip Altbach, one of the most important education comparatists worldwide, claims
that  “no  country  can  afford  mass  access  and  high  quality  -  it  will  never  happen”
(Altbach et al. 2012: 186–187) and Turkey is certainly no exception. The massification of
higher education through the opening of “backwater” universities in every province of
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Turkey,  mostly  without  sufficient  and  qualified  academic  staff,  apparently  made  a
massive  purge  technically  possible.  Because  the  quantity  is  always  more  easily
replaceable than the quality. 
15 Consequently,  nearly  four-fifths  (4890 of  6081)  of  the  academics  purged during the
post-July  15  state  of  emergency  rule  were  from  “provincial  universities”  and  the
percentage  of  purged  signatory  academics  within  this  group  was  an  insignificant
minority (see Figure 1)11. 
Figure 1: Ratios of purged “Academics for Peace” to all purged academics in the three largest cities
and the rest of the country.
(Source: AfP Solidarity Database)
16 For example, the most massive purges occurred in Çanakkale 18 Mart University and
Kütahya Dumlupınar University, both founded in 1992 and where the ratios of purged
allegedly Gülenist academics to all active academic staff respectively reached to 12.40%
(205 out of 1653 academics) and 13.59% (168 out of 1236 academics). However, in these
universities there were only 2 purged AfP signatory academics, one of whom was a PhD
student in İstanbul  with a  position at  Dumlupınar in the framework of  the Faculty
Member  Trainee  Program  (ÖYP)12.  In  other  words,  while  the  purged  right-leaning
academics were mostly from provincial universities, that was not statistically the case
for  signatory  academics.  Officially  45.78%  of  the  signatory  academics  purged  with
executive decrees were from İstanbul, Ankara, or İzmir, but when we take into account
the  number  of  purged  research  assistants  in  the  framework  of  the  Teaching  Staff
Trainee  Program  (ÖYP)  studying  in  İstanbul,  Ankara,  or  İzmir  with  a  provincial
university affiliation on paper, this percentage reaches approximately to 55%. Finally,
when we add to this value the number of all dismissals, forced retirements, and forced
resignations due to governmental or administrative pressure over signatory academics,
the percentage of signatory academics who were purged while working, studying, and/
or living in the three principal cities of Turkey increases to approximately 65% of all
purged signatories. 
17 Thus, given how an overwhelming majority of purged academics were accused of being
connected  to  the  Gülen  movement,  and  that  the  majority  of  this  group  was  from
provincial universities, one could conclude that the massive character of this purge was
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related  to  the  global  massification  of  higher  education.  This  is  one  of  the
manifestations  of  neoliberalization  process,  seeking  to  transform  universities  into
“corporate  suppliers”  (Collini  2017) in  order  to  contribute  to  regional  and national
economic and societal development (J. Goddard 2011; Pinheiro et al. 2018; Trippl et al.
2015). The neoliberalization of universities has been carried out in the wake of ideas
about  “knowledge-based  economy,”  which  were  in  reality  nothing  but  “economic
imaginary”  (Jessop  2017),  and  their  effects  have  always  been  “mediated  through
inherited  institutional  landscapes”  (Brenner  et  al.  2010).  In  the  case  of  the  new
Turkey’s provincial universities, as their host cities were generally deprived of a high
value-added regional knowledge economy and their processes of establishment were
almost  without  exception  embedded  in  local  and  national  power  relations  (Şengül
2014), clientelism frequently served as a way of recruitment (For some concrete cases
of  clientelist  recruitment,  see  Tekin  2019:  29–32).  In  these  universities  academic
capitalism gained, to use Bob Jessop’s concepts (2018), predatory rather than market-
rational characteristics. That is to say, even though academic capitalism has more or
less predatory characteristics everywhere, distortion of rational “capitalist principles
for personal, institutional, or political gain” (Jessop 2018: 108) are prevalent in these
universities.  It  is  evident  that  provincial  universities  in  Turkey  have  always
represented  a  target  for  right-leaning  political  movements,  including  Islamists  and
ultra-nationalists, within the context of the goal of conquering power. As a result, the
power bloc of the post-15 July did not hesitate in carrying out a sweeping purge in
these provincial universities in order to replace one group of right-leaning (allegedly
Gülenists) academics with another one (apparently ultra-nationalist, Euroasianist, and
pro-AKP). However, the purge of AfP signatories had been started six months before
the July 15 incident and the profile of the signatory academics was in many respects
quite different from that of right-leaning purged academics. Close examination of the
beginning of the AfP purge will help shed light on some distinguishing features of this
group’s profile as well as the characteristics of their purge. 
 
The First Phase of Purge of the AfP in Private and Public
Universities 
18 Six  months  before  the  July  15  incident  and  eight  and  a  half  months  before  the
publication of the first academic purge list annexed to State of Emergency Executive
Decree No. 672, signatory academics had already become the target of the government.
Following the release of the petition entitled “We will not be party to this crime!” on
January 11, 2016, a lynching campaign was immediately launched against them under
the  guidance  of  Recep  Tayyip  Erdoğan,  president  of  Turkey.  In  this  context,  the
signatory  academics  endured  a  series  of  rights  violations  in  the  hands  of  political
authorities and university administrations; some of the signatories were detained and
arrested,  while  some  others  were  suspended  or  dismissed  from  their  academic
positions. During this period, as one of the signatories, while participating in a financial
solidarity campaign, I also offered to update the list collectively prepared by the AfP
Solidarity volunteers, recording the signatory academics’ job losses due to dismissals,
retirements,  and  resignations.  In  this  context,  I  had  the  opportunity  to  collect
information about the profile of the first purged signatories and, in September 2016,
shared those findings to the AfP email group. Those shared findings were based on
some descriptive statistics about 105 academics that were already purged, and nearly
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half  of  them were  working  in  private  foundation  universities.  As  the  expansion  of
private  universities  in  Turkey  might  be  understood  in  relation  to  the  global
neoliberalization of  universities,  let  me share  some of  the  information about  these
institutions. 
19 The introduction of private foundation universities in the Turkey’s higher education
system  dates  back  to  the  aftermath  of  the  1980  military  coup,  when  the
neoliberalization process had newly started. In 1984, with an amendment to Article No.
130 of the 1982 Constitution – also known as the Putsch Constitution, foundations were
allowed to  establish  nonprofit  private  education organizations  alongside  the  public
institutions (Birler 2012: p.140). The number of private foundation universities was 3
until  1995,  and  it  increased  to  23  in  2001.  In  the  wake  of  the  massification  and
marketization  of  higher  education  under  AKP  governments,  however,  this  number
reached  54  in  2010  and  75  in  2020,  despite  the  closure  of  15  private  universities
allegedly founded and run by Gülenist circles in 2016. 
20 The  great  majority  of  foundation  universities  in  Turkey  are  in  fact  profit-seeking
institutions and, to achieve their goal, quite similar to public provincial universities,
they  need  to  maintain  good  relations  with  the  central  government.  Serdar
Değirmencioğlu stresses the similarity between these two “new generation” neoliberal
university governance models by highlighting two sequences that happened before the
AfP case: in the first sequence, at an opening ceremony, the president of a provincial
university kissed the hand of a notable donor, who was an industrialist and a “true
believer” in the AKP government, while in the second, during an introductory meeting
at a new private foundation university, a young, newly employed scholar encountered
the  founder  of  the  private  university  and  kissed  his  extended  hand,  as  expected
(Değirmencioğlu, 2015). “Paternalistic respect” to political and/or economic power is
apparently a common denominator of these newly founded institutions, and these ones
did  not  hesitate  to  immediately  punish  signatory  academics  just  after  a  lynching
campaign being launched by the central government. 
21 The first job losses were recorded in private universities located in metropolises, which
resulted with the dismissal, forced resignation or retirement of 41 signatory academics.
With the lack of employment security in most of these private institutions, these rapid
dismissals were hardly coincidental. 
22 Signatory  academics  in  provincial  universities  encountered  with  bureaucratic  and
administrative oppression in addition to the lynching campaign against the AfP since
January 2016. Disciplinary investigations and preventive suspensions were frequently
used methods by public university administrations. Unlike their private counterparts,
public universities did not immediately dismiss signatory academics, who are public
servants entitled to legal protections under the Public Servants Law. Some university
administrations, like that of Mersin University, adopted legally controversial methods,
such as non-renewal of employment contracts for non-tenured signatory academics. 
23 The  declaration  of  state  of  emergency  came  to  the  help  of  these  university
administrations. After that, a large number of public universities gradually joined the
purge against AfP signatories. On September 1, 2016, the Decree Laws No. 672 and 673
were  published  with  the  names  of  44  signatory  academics  in  the  annexed  lists  of
dismissed public servants.
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24 As the figure below shows, apart from Kocaeli University and Ankara University that
jointed to the purge after the declaration of the state of emergency, the first wave of
purge had already started through the “new generation” universities  just  after  the
petition got into the circulation (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Universities in which more than 4 signatory academics have lost their jobs by September 12,
2016. 
(Source: AfP Solidarity Database)
25 Furthermore, on October 29, 2016, the amendment to the Law on Higher Education,
which  re-regulated  the  appointment  of  university  presidents,  doubtlessly  had  an
impact  on  the  evolution  of  the  purge.  According  to  the  amendment,  “public
universities’ presidents will be appointed by the President of the Republic from among
three  candidates  nominated  by  Higher  Education  Council,  and  foundation-owned
universities  presidents  will  be  appointed  also  by  the  President from  among  the
candidates nominated by the boards of  trustees and approved by Higher Education
Council” (see Akça et al. 2017: 95). Thereby it has nullified intra-university elections
and  jettisoned  democratic  input  of  the  eligible  faculty  members  in  the  selection
procedure of their president.
26 Following  the  ratification  of  this  amendment,  public  university  presidents,  whose
appointment  renewal  henceforth  depends  on  the  individual  will  of  the  country’s
president,  have  turned  the  heat  up  and  increased  the  pressure  on  the  signatory
academics. Some of these presidents chose a massive purge without distinction (see
Figure 3), some others pursued a strategy based on sacrificing a relatively small group
of academics by either directly sending their names to the capital, Ankara, or indirectly
compelling them to resign or retire. A minority of these presidents did not touch the
signatories. 
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Figure 3: Universities that had purged more than 20 signatory academics (i.e. more than 3.5% of all
purged signatory academics).
(Source: AfP Solidarity Database)
27 One can make a certain correlation between these three attitudes and three types of
universities, according to the typology developed by Muzaffer Kaya (2018). For Kaya the
three main category of universities in Turkey are as follows: “1) higher tier public and
private universities in the metropolises; (2) lower tier private universities that serviced
the  lower  classes  mostly  located  in  the  metropolises;  (3)  and  lower  tier  public
universities located mostly in smaller and middle-sized cities” (Kaya 2018). Provided
that “lower tier public universities in the metropolises” fall under the university type
2,  this  categorization,  which  can  be  represented  as  a  pyramidal  structure,  is  quite
illustrative to understand the differentiation of university presidents in their purge
strategies. 
28 Figure  4  shows  clearly  that  among  the  universities  with  the  largest  numbers  of
signatories,  as  seen on Figure 3,  only Ankara University,  executed a  massive purge
against AfP. 
Figure 4: Universities with the largest number of signatory academics in January 2016.
(Source: AfP Solidarity Database)
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Humanities and Social Sciences as Target of the Purge
29 The difference between the right-leaning and left-leaning purged academics was not
only  related  to  the  “geographical  spatiality”  of  the  universities;  there  was  also  a
difference  in  their  scientific  disciplines’  place  within  the  web  of  academic  power
relations. The “Turkey’s Academy – Under the State of Emergency” report indicates
that of the 6081 academics who were dismissed with executive decrees, 2493 held a
degree in the social sciences and humanities, while 3067 were specialized in natural
and  applied  sciences.  The  numbers  of  dismissed  academics  from  the  fields  of
fundamental  sciences  and  arts  and  performances  were  respectively  342  and  81
(Academics for Human Rights 2018). According to these figures, academics from applied
sciences  seem  to  have  been  relatively  most  exposed  to  the  academic  purge  and
necropolitical violence. However, when we zoom in on the specific cluster of AfP cases,
the ratios among the scientific disciplines change dramatically. 
30 In a preliminary comparative analysis concerning the case of AfP, Efe Kerem Sözeri had
already clearly showed how much social scientists and humanists outweigh among the
signatory academics (Sözeri 2016). Moreover, based on a dataset of 4,279 academics he
created that comprises of 2,212 AfP signatories and the signatories of the ‘counter’-
petition by “Academics for Turkey”, the 54% of the signatories of AfP are women, and
one-third  of  the  peace  signatories  are  from  universities  abroad  (33%)  in  a  sharp
contrast with the majority-male “Academics for Turkey”.
31 The  pattern  of  preponderant  persecution  of  the  social  scientists  and  humanists
continued throughout the purge of AfP. On September 12, 2016, of the 112 dismissed
AfP signatories, 87 were from the humanities, arts, and social sciences (see Figure 5). In
other words, the purge of the AfP, unlike that of alleged Gülenists, unfolded first of all
as a purge of the social scientists, artists, philosophers, and humanists from Turkey’s
universities13. The pattern of the purge following the state of emergency with executive
decrees did not deviate from the initial one (see Figure 6). 
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Figure 5: Distribution of 105 dismissed AfP in September 2016, according to their disciplines.
(Source: AfP Solidarity Database)
Figure 6: Distribution of 414 AfP purged with executive decrees according to their disciplines.
(Source: AfP Solidarity Database)
32 At this point, two interrelated questions need to be briefly answered: why the purge of
AfP targeted social scientists and humanists,  especially in metropolitan universities,
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and  why  this  group  of  scholars  had  become  increasingly  dissident  and  dared  to
challenge the Turkish state over a question where the raison d’état14 draws the red line.
The answer to these questions seems to lie in the declined status of social sciences and
humanities within the power structure of the neoliberal university. This entails, on the
one hand, a sentiment of frustration among social scientists and humanists who have
become  increasingly  alienated  and  been  deprived  of  not  only  material  but  also
symbolical resources of representation, while,  on the other hand, as a reply to this
structural frustration, the rise of engaged scholarship perspectives in social sciences
and humanities. 
33 “The conflict of the faculties” and the uneven hierarchy of the university structure
goes back to the late 18th century. In a similar fashion, based on the dynamics of the
20th century universities, Pierre Bourdieu showed how the political leanings of scholars
correspond to their positions in the academic field, and a subordinated position in the
academic field creates a tendency for a left-leaning political stance (Bourdieu 1988).
Indeed,  the  incontestable  weight  of  social  scientists  and  humanists  among  the
signatory  academics  may  be  considered  in  the  wake  of  Bourdieusian  social  space
theory. Karl Spracklen, who published a stimulating book on the threats that social
sciences have faced, states that “the lack of confidence in the social sciences predicting
the future is the reason why its findings are not useful to the instrumental logic of
capitalism or government bureaucracies” (Spracklen 2015: 27). Based on the discourse
of the uselessness of social  sciences and humanities,  social  sciences and humanities
scholars, who are subordinated to this symbolic violence, tend to defend, generally in
vain, their disciplines’ benefits to economic and social development and become party
to “academic capitalism” and “publish or perish” culture in order to survive. It is not a
coincidence that “engaged scholarship” emerged and blossomed in the late 1990s all
around the world, especially following the publication of Ernest Boyer’s The Scholarship
of Engagement in 1996 (see Kajner 2013: 10). When he published this groundbreaking
work,  neoliberal  governments  had already reshaped their  higher education policies
based on a perspective that sees universities “as vital sources of new knowledge and
innovative  thinking,  as  providers  of  skilled  personnel  and  credible  credentials,  as
contributors  to  innovation,  as  attractors  of  international  talent  and  business
investment into a region” (Boulton; Lucas 2011: 2508). Embracing not only ideological
but also economic functions attached to it,  more universities have moved from the
periphery to the center of neoliberal government agendas. In return, the scholars in
the social sciences and humanities became more marginalized and powerless in the
neoliberal university structure, while at the same time they became more “critical and
transformative  engaged  scholarship  reach[ed]  far  beyond  the  walls  of  academia”
(Kajner 2013: 16). 
34 In the case of the AfP, this trend is more noticeable especially among the early career
or PhD candidate signatories in the social sciences and humanities. As they entered the
profession  in  the  2010s,  these  higher  education  institutions  had  already  been
marginalized  and  depreciated  by  the  neoliberalization  process.  Statistics  about  the
purged signatory academics also confirm it. On September, 12, 2016, when dismissals
from  private  foundation  universities  already  had  statistical  importance,  academics
with  non-tenured  teaching  positions,  such  as  assistant  professors,  lecturers,  and
experts,  had  a  ratio  of  53%,  whereas  those  who  dismissed  from  tenured  positions
(professors and associate professors) comprised of only 26 % in the whole purged group
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(see Figure 7). In their pioneering work, Aslı Vatansever and Serpil Gezici Yalçın (2015)
highlight  the  over-representation  of  assistant  professors  in  private  foundation
universities.  Those institutions operate as  “academic sweatshops” (Sharff;  Lessinger
1994) dependent on the labor of assistant professors. They are simultaneously more
competent to teach than PhD candidate teaching assistants and “cheaper” to employ
than senior scholars. Indeed, according to statistics provided by the Higher Education
Council,  in  2016,  when  the  purge  started,  the  proportion  of  assistant  professors,
lecturers  and experts  within all  private  foundation universities’  academic  staff  was
61.26%,  while  the  tenured positions  represented only  25.6%.  However,  when public
universities were added to the purge wave with the declaration of emergency rule, the
research and teaching assistants substituted for assistant professors and, at a ratio of
39%, became the main victims of the purge (see Figure 8), approximately 80% of them
specialized in social sciences and humanities (see Figure 9). Again, when we look at
statistics  of  2016  provided  by  the  Higher  Education  Council,  we  see  that  in  public
universities  the  ratio  of  non-tenured  teaching  academics  within  all  academic  staff
decreased  from  61,26%  to  35.85%,  while  the  research  and  teaching  assistants’
proportion  rose  to  33.34%.  In  other  words,  public  and  private  universities  are
distinguishing from each other by their recruitment strategies, and consequently by
their purge strategies. However, the two main target groups of the purge (novice PhD
holders in private universities, and PhD candidates in public universities) are drawn
together  by  two elements:  being specialized in  social  sciences  and humanities,  and
being in the early phase of their academic career. 
35 To conclude,  the data presented here proves  that  there are discernable  differences
between the profiles of the right-leaning (mainly allegedly Gülenist) and left-leaning
(mainly AfP signatory) purged academics. First of all, while the purge of right-leaning
conservative  academics  happened  predominantly  in  provincial  “backwater”  public
universities,  their  left-leaning counterparts  faced the purge mostly  in  metropolitan
interest-oriented private foundation universities,  and in certain metropolitan public
universities,  such  as  Ankara  University,  Yıldız  Teknik  University,  or  Marmara
University,  whose  administrations,  especially  presidents,  were  in  tune  with  the
political power’s agenda. 
Figure 7: Distribution of the dismissed AfP according to their titles by September 12, 2016. 
(Source: AfP Solidarity Database)
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Figure 8: Distribution of AfP academics expelled with executive decrees according to their titles. 
(Source: AfP Solidarity Database)
Figure 9: Distribution of the research assistants expelled with executive decrees according to their
disciplines. 
(Source: AfP Solidarity Database)
36 The  second  distinction  between  the  two  categories  pertains  to  their  scientific
disciplines: while the purged right-leaning conservative scholars were more often from
STEM (sciences, technologies, engineering, mathematics) disciplines, which are closer
to power positions in the academic field,  the great majority of signatory academics
specialized in the arts, humanities, or social sciences. Furthermore, the latter group
mostly comprised younger scholars who had newly entered the academic profession in
a time when the academic field was shrinking and more precarious than ever before,
especially the humanities and social sciences. In short, being a social scientist, artist, or
humanist, having entered the profession in the last decade, possessing a critical and
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epistemologically  constructivist  point  of  view,  and  being  an  engaged  scholar  are
frequent common denominators of the purged AfP group.
37 Additionally,  women  do  constitute  a  majority  (54%)  among  the  signatories  and
represent  50.5% of  all  purged signatory academics  and are  without  dispute a  more
engaged group within the AfP. It is well known that the feminization of professions – in
our case, the social science and humanities disciplines – is always connected to how
these professions are increasingly excluded from power positions and subsequently
abandoned  by  men.  Especially  since  the  2007–2008  global  financial  crisis,  the
“shecession”–not only in the sense of job losses but also regarding the patterns of job
devaluation–  along  with  a  patriarchal  conservative  drift  around  the  world  has
transformed  women  and  feminized  professional  communities  into  dissidents.
Composed mainly of scholars from devaluated social sciences and humanities, the AfP
case is not exempt from this fact. 
38 However, these frequent common denominators do not mean that signatory academics
constituted a unified, non-stratified homogeneous community beyond class-, race-, and
gender-based  disparities.  On  the  contrary,  inequalities  among  the  signatories
immediately came to surface and eventually led to the aggravation of injustices. During
and after the purge, these injustices have affected both those who stayed in Turkey
under conditions of civic death and those who moved abroad to live in exile15. 
39 Drawing  from  the  perspective  of  the  initiators  and  participants  in  three  academic
solidarity organizations based in France, the US, and Germany, the exile experiences of
the purged scholars will  be the indirect subject of the next section. The reason for
focusing on international solidarity organizations instead of exiled academics per se is
to unravel the brutal structure of neoliberalized global academia, instead of framing it
as a narrative of “victimhood”. 
 
Academic Exile, or Migration from the Body of the
Centaur to Its Head 
40 The consecutive and continuous dismissals of signatory academics following the release
of the petition, even before the July 15 “coup within a coup” incident,  necessitated
efforts of  finding a new job.  The first  dismissed academics were mostly working at
private  foundation  universities,  and  this  group  was  more  acquainted  with  the
precariousness of neoliberal academic work than those who were employed by public
universities. In a short time, however, they were faced with the reality that they and
their job applications had been blacklisted. Therefore, their searches shifted abroad
and many scholars,  including myself,  for  the  first  time,  discovered the widespread
existence  of  international  organizations  and  networks  with  the  aim  of  supporting
academics under threat.
41 But,  in  fact,  neither  academic  exile  nor  academic  rescue  organizations  are  new
phenomena. The first massive academic purge in the modern history took place just
after Adolf Hitler became chancellor of Germany on January 30,  1933,  and the Civil
Service Law enacted in April 1933 that requires the Jews and “politically unreliable”
scholars to leave their positions at German universities. As Simon Lässig points out,
between “1933 and 1941 roughly 2,000 academics who had lost their positions and had
been at risk in Germany and its annexed territories were able to emigrate and secure
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livelihoods  in  their  new  countries  of  residence.  They  headed  to  France,  Turkey,
Palestine, and, above all, the United States and Britain” (Lässig 2017: 774). Given the
fact that the post-war expansion of higher education had not yet started, the number of
exiled  academics  from Germany  during  the  interwar  period  was  enormous.  As  the
academic crackdown escalated in Germany, two separate initiatives were inaugurated
in May 1933: The Academic Assistance Council (AAC) in the U.K., and The Emergency
Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholars in the U.S.  Unfortunately,  first,  the
after effects of the Great Depression and later the WWII had widely stood in the way of
these ventures. Attenuation of the academic job market in their settlement countries
allowed  a  minority  of  exiled  scholars  to  find  tenure  track  faculty  positions.  For
example,  as  Laurel  Leff  indicated,  The  Emergency  Committee  in  Aid  of  Displaced
Foreign Scholars received more than 6,000 appeals from European countries and ended
up only placing 335 scholars (Leff 2019). Leff also underlines in her book Well Worth
Saving the fact that the literature on the intellectual migration of the 1930s and 1940s
has  generally  tended  to  concentrate  on  stories  of  those  who  succeeded,  and  thus
become a “literature of celebration” with strong emphasis on the triumph of the U.S. –
and the West in a broader sense– and the bereavement of Germany. But in reality, the
majority of purged scholars’  applications to Western universities had been rejected.
Only a minority of academics had the opportunity to be rescued from persecution and a
few had to continue their academic careers in their settlement countries. 
42 Returning to the AfP case and the exile experiences of signatory academics, at first
sight, the situation might be considered as less somber. First of all, today, the number
of  humanitarian rescue organizations  as  well  as  that  of  universities  all  around the
world  is  remarkably  higher  than  80  years  ago.  The  most  crucial  difference  here,
however, lies in the fact that the risk they have faced and endured was not that of
physical death. When they decided to leave Turkey, they were running away from a
slight  possibility  of  imprisonment,  whereas  the  risk  of  being  condemned  to  “civic
death” was posing a greater threat. We will examine the consequences of this risk of
civic death in relation with the current “conflict of the faculties” thereinafter. First,
let’s look closely at the situation of numerous humanitarian rescue organizations that
were already well established when the purge of AfP started in 2016. 
43 Humanitarian aid organizations have developed rapidly in these last three decades in
parallel with neoliberal globalization and the rise of necropolitics, in such a way that
they constitute a field, where the law of the market works (Carbonnier 2015; Haskaj
2018;  Weiss  2013).  Tom Weiss  stresses  three transformative trends of  humanitarian
activities  following  the  post-Cold  War  period  as  militarization,  politicization,  and
marketization (Weiss 2013: 54). In an earlier work, MacFarlane and Weiss had pointed
out how, in many cases, the states’ political interests intersect with the humanitarian
motivations (MacFarlane; Weiss 2000). Thus, one can claim that in the humanitarian
assistance  field,  political  interests,  profit-seeking  motives  are,  as  Viviana  Zelizer
conceptualizes  in  her  analysis  of  interactions  between  monetary  transactions  and
intimate relationships (2005), intermingled in some cases with solidarity values, and in
some others with philanthropic efforts. Perhaps one of the most concrete examples of
the political embeddedness of humanitarian actions is Turkey’s humanitarian practice
in the academic field. On the one hand, thousands of persecuted academics left Turkey
to find shelter and jobs abroad, and this brutality led to worldwide criticism of the
Turkish government’s violation of academic freedom and freedom of expression. On
the  other  hand,  same  government  sought  to  gain  worldwide  appreciation  through
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hosting  and  employing  hundreds  of  exiled  Syrian  academics  in  the  universities  of
Turkey (Solmaz 2019). Not to mention, Turkey’s diplomatically and militarily proactive
involvement in the Syrian civil  war since its  outbreak in 2011 that had triggered a
humanitarian crisis and the Syrian mass migration, including that of Syrian scholars. 
44 The principal organizations and networks involved in the migration of academics from
Turkey were founded at the turn of the 21st century and multiplied in the post-9/11 and
post-Arab Spring warfare eras together with the worldwide authoritarian drifts of the
last decade: the US-based Scholars at Risk (SAR), founded in 1999; the UK-based Council
for Assisting Refugee Academics (CARA) in 1999;  the US-based Scholar Rescue Fund
(SRF) in 2002; the Germany-based Philipp Schwartz Initiative Fellowships in 2016; and
the France-based PAUSE Program in 2017. While the private donators constitute the
main source of funding for the first three of these organizations based in the US and
the  UK,  in  other  initiatives  established  in  continental  Europe,  the  states  have  also
become involved. Some organizations have institutional pasts going back to the first
half of the 20th century, such as CARA and the Scholar Rescue Fund respectively under
the  names  of  the  Academic  Assistance  Council  (AAC)  and Institute  of  International
Education ( Sertdemir-Özdemir et al. 2019: 7–10). These organizations have been joined
by new or renewed foundations associated with leftist political parties, such as the Rosa
Luxemburg Foundation and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Germany. Moreover, new
networks  and  formations  also  came  into  existence  led  by  scholars  with  a  rather
“amateur  spirit”  and intentions  of  demonstrating solidarity  with at-risk  academics,
such as Academy in Exile in Germany in 2017, Off-University in Germany in 2018, the
New  University  in  Exile  Consortium  in  the  US  in  2018,  and  Université  Libre  de
Bruxelles’s Solidarity Fund in Belgium in 2019. Thus, we are considering a field, which
is highly prone to political and economic influences due to its funding structure, but
also, in comparison to other fields of humanitarian aid, this field has a unique character
grounded upon the relatively autonomous structure of academia in Western countries.
45 I have had many experiences with the above-mentioned initiatives that let me observe
them closely. As a French-speaking signatory academic who was not purged, I had the
opportunity  to  witness  the  founding  process  of  PAUSE in  late  2016.  After  being
subjected to a trial in court on charges of “making terrorist propaganda” in the fall of
2017, I applied for a visiting research scholar position at the New School in the US that
was offered by the New University in Exile Consortium and for which an application to
the Scholar Rescue Fund was a prerequisite. During my stay in the US in the 2018-2019
academic  year,  I  moderated  an  online  seminar  at  Off-University  together  with  a
persecuted jobless colleague living in Turkey, who is also an old friend. In order to
evaluate  how  these  initiatives,  whose  target  population  are  mostly  scholars  of  the
social  sciences  and humanities,  were  affected by  the  globally  hegemonic  neoliberal
reasoning, alongside my personal observations, interviews with two colleagues from
France on the real outputs of the PAUSE Program, the initiator of The New University
in Exile Consortium Arien Mack, the author of “A Light in Dark Times - The New School
for Social Research and Its University in Exile” Judith Friedlander, and, finally, Julia
Strutz, an AfP signatory human geographer resided in Berlin and one of the initiators
of  Off-University,  will  be  examined  below,  The  idea  that  resistance  against
authoritarianism should not be separated from resistance against neoliberalism will
also be discussed.
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As Befits the Name: PAUSE 
46 The first  dismissed group of  signatory academics  at  private  foundation universities
largely comprised of  junior PhDs,  including those who had obtained their  graduate
degrees abroad. Such scholars usually had more opportunities to immediately find host
institutions  in  the  Euro-Atlantic  countries  for  visiting  fellowship  positions;  their
academic and professional backgrounds allowed them to be selected more easily than
signatories with no experience abroad.  At  the beginning,  this  imbalanced situation,
which is a reverberation of the basic logic of reproduction of inequality, did not pose a
serious  problem  since  everyone  was  under  the  impression  that  the  purge  and
repression of academics would end soon. As outlined above, however, the course of
events was contrary to initial expectations and the situation quickly went from bad to
worse. The number of dismissed signatory research and teaching assistants among all
dismissed academics showed a stable increase. Mostly as graduate students in Turkey’s
universities, they were not even eligible to apply for international opportunities for at-
risk  scholars.  Such  programs  had  been  initially  designed  for  threatened  senior
academics; threatened PhD students were excluded. As soon as this incompatibility was
recognized,  many  signatory  academics  working  abroad  or  in  relatively  sheltering
universities  in  Turkey  put  together  their  efforts  to  support  the  search  for  visiting
positions by signatories that are relatively deprived of international connections, in
addition  to  initiate  the  creation  of  internationally  funded  fellowships,  in  order  to
support all purged signatory academics who could not, or did not want to, go abroad. 
47 In  this  context,  first  Eğitim-Sen  (Education  and  Science  Workers’  Union)  replied
affirmatively to the proposition of signatory academics to create a financial support
network  for  its  persecuted  and  fired  members.  Secondly,  the  Social  Research
Foundation (SAV) established a fund for signatory academics, who had lost their jobs
while working in private foundation universities, hence were not members of Eğitim-
Sen. In the same direction, a French-speaking group of signatory academics, including
myself, circulated a call within the Comité International de Solidarité avec les Universitaires
pour  la  Paix  (CISUP)  network  to  fundraise  for  a  project  that  “aims  to  support  the
scientific  research  carried  out  at  masters,  doctoral  and  post-doctoral  level  by  the
academics who are deprived of the opportunity to conduct their researches as a result
of the restriction of academic freedom by political pressure.” At the time, owing to the
“full-court press” of the AfP international working group’s volunteers, public opinion
was  molded  in  favor  of  the  signatory  academics.  However,  unlike  the  US-based
crowdfunding campaign that was successfully conducted nearly one year later (see RIT
- Research Institute on Turkey, 2017), the proposal could not further progress in France
due to the lack of a legal-institutional sponsor to run the campaign. 
48 Another factor that worsened the situation was the confiscation of the passports of
academics,  who  were  dismissed  by  executive  decrees  during  the  emergency  rule.
Nevertheless,  this  at  least  created  awareness  in  the  France-based  solidarity  circles
about the profile  and the needs of  persecuted young social  science and humanities
scholars. The PAUSE Program was announced in October 2016 and formally established
in January 2017 by an agreement between the Ministry for Education and Research,
Collège  de  France,  and  the  Chancellery  of  Parisian  Universities.  With  concrete
contributions and advice  from some members  of  the French-based solidarity  group
with  the  AfP,  the  program  extended  its  support  to  threatened  graduate  students.
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Between 2017 and 2019, 33% of 201 threatened scholars, who benefited from the PAUSE
Program, were PhD students (see Program PAUSE - Collège de France, 2020). 
49 Following the organizational model of the Scholar Rescue Fund (i.e. undertaking a part
of the salaries to be paid to endangered visiting scholars by the host institutes) and the
Philipp Schwartz Initiative of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation as a funding
model (based mainly on public funding), the PAUSE Program started to support French
universities and laboratories willing to host scholars in exile. No one can deny the fact
that one of the French government’s priorities was to catch up with other “imperial”16
countries already having their own humanitarian programs to support exiled scholars.
However,  it  is simultaneously  clear  that  all  of  these  programs provided significant
support to the persecuted and exiled academics in their search of livelihood, security,
and temporary academic positions. They also provided an opportunity to collectively
raise their voices in order to bring their cause, or their case, into the attention of the
international public.
50 The inauguration of the PAUSE Program in the beginning of 2017 corresponded to the
worst period of the purge of the AfP in Turkey; 299 of 415 dismissals with decree laws
took place in the first three months of 2017 (see Figure 10).  This triggered massive
applications  to  visiting  scholar  positions  abroad,  which  raises  the  question  of
guidelines  and  selection  criteria  in  determining  the  best  candidates  for  temporary
positions: is it the academic excellence, the level of risk, or affirmative action? 
Figure 10: Numbers of expelled signatory academics by executive decrees.
(Source: AfP Solidarity Database)
51 This question preoccupied not only the selection committees of host institutions but
also the persecuted AfP community, in which preexisting inequalities of class, gender,
race, age, seniority, and so on among the signatories surfaced in a more resounding
way during the repression period. In that context, a risk assessment questionnaire was
proposed by a group of signatories, according to which priority was given to dismissed
academics over those who still had their jobs, to those who had already faced trial over
those who have not, to graduate students over senior academics, to scholars without
international networks over those who had them, to women over men, to people with
children over those without familial obligations, and so on. Leaving “excellence” aside,
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these criteria aimed to ward off the effects of academic capitalism while dealing with
academic repression. 
52 Unlike the German case,  in France a considerable number of  academic institutions,
including the PAUSE Program’s selection committee, took into account the risk reports
provided by a volunteer group composed of signatories from France,  Germany, and
Turkey.  Unsurprisingly,  some signatories  with  connections  in  France  bypassed  this
volunteer-based questionnaire procedure run, as some French academic institutions
prioritized  the  criterion  of  “excellence”  or  acquaintanceship  rather  than  risk
assessment.  However,  in  the  framework  of  the  PAUSE  Program,  many  French
universities selected numerous signatory academics assessed as “top priority” by the
questionnaire. Based on this assessment, among the ‘top priority’ academics, those who
kept their passports or found an informal way to leave Turkey could continue their
academic work, at least hypothetically, in France.
 
Between Hosting a Colleague and Helping a Victim 
53 As one of the volunteer signatory academics, who collaborated in the preparation of
the abovementioned risk reports, I had opportunity to closely observe the evolution of
the PAUSE program. In the first two years, approximately 60% of the laureates of this
program were from Turkey (“PAUSE a aidé 98 chercheurs en exil” 2018: 39) and a great
majority of them were persecuted signatories. In 2020, the total number of academics
hosted by French institutions through the program increased to 222. However, to my
knowledge, during this period there is no Pause laureate from Turkey, who has been
recruited in a tenured position at any French academic institution. Alongside of my
own  observations,  in  order  to  have  preliminary  ideas  about  the  reasons  of  non-
integration of exiled scholars to the French academia, exploratory interviews with two
academics from France, who have been engaged in hosting exiled scholars from Turkey,
will be utilized. 
54 Both interviewees are women from the social sciences and do have ties in Turkey. One
of  them is  a  professor  and an executive  (Interviewee 1);  in  other  words,  relatively
influential  in  her  institution.  The  second  is  a  research  fellow  with  a  tenured
appointment (Interviewee 2). Neither of them were initiators of the PAUSE Program,
but they have had many experiences of hosting endangered and exiled scholars in their
own institutions since 2016. 
55 The second interviewee, who is also one of the signatories of the peace petition, have
joined academic freedom and solidarity activities in Turkey right after the release of
the petition, or a year before the PAUSE Program was launched:
Threatened scholars came to our university at first through the French Consulate’s
Short-term  Visiting  Scholar  fellowship  announced  in  March  2016.  At  the  time,
approximately  15  signatory  academics  applied  to  this  fellowship  through  our
research center. Two of them were awarded and came to our university for two
months (Interviewee 2).
56 At  the  beginning,  the  political  repression  of  signatory  academics  in  Turkey  was
considered temporary and almost no one expected it to evolve into a massive purge.
Though a significant number of colleagues from different universities around the world
showed their solidarity by allocating short-term visiting positions in their institutions
to  persecuted  signatory  academics.  Approximately  one-third  of  signatories,  be  it
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lecturers, researchers, or graduate students, were from universities abroad. This group,
being relatively beyond the range of the Turkish government’s repression, played a key
role in organizing such solidarity movements17. International academia was also very
sensitive  to  the  situation,  especially  social  scientists  and  humanists,  and  reacted
immediately (HRFT Academy 2019: 11–12). Interviewee 2’s efforts to raise awareness in
her institution about the AfP case might be considered as an example of this situation: 
The  support  of  my  colleagues  for  these  programs  was  100%.  We  held  a
demonstration to show our solidarity with peace academics and everyone came.
The point of view of the people was very positive and, truly speaking, they saw me
at  the time as  a  reference person.  When I  talked to  them about  a  scholar  in  a
difficult  position  and  proposed  inviting  him  or  her,  they  were  accepting
(Interviewee 2).
57 The  positive  attitude  of  the  faculty  for  hosting  threatened  scholars  was  equally
highlighted by Interviewee 1: 
The city where my university is located has a socialist tradition and the proportion
of left-leaning engaged scholars has been always high. Before the PAUSE Program,
we had already launched a Refugee Student Program, with which we had enrolled a
lot of students from refugee camps after conducting interviews with them. In such
an environment, almost all faculties supported the PAUSE Program (Interviewee 1). 
58 However,  having favorable  feelings  for  someone or  something in  advance does  not
always guarantee a fertile relationship between the interested parties, especially when
uneven positions like “host” and “exiled” or “assister” and “assisted” are deepened by
sociocultural inequalities. As Nil Mutluer (2017) and Aslı Vatansever (2018) separately
highlighted,  the  majority  of  “host”  scholars  are  inclined  to  see  exiled  scholars  as
“victims”  and/or  “guests,”  which  makes  a  relationship  between  peers  impossible.
According to Interviewee 2, such a point of view stems from the fact that there is a
“shade of romanticism” about Turkey among some French scholars: 
I met two French professors at the university while I was accompanying an exiled
scholar for her enrolment procedures. One of them even talked to us about Yaşar
Kemal.  They  had a  romantic  imaginary  of  Turkey  and of  repression  in  Turkey.
According to them, all people living in Turkey are naturally subject to repression
and persecution. It seems to me that they aren’t aware of some realities. They can’t
see the relativity (Interviewee 2). 
59 Indeed, such a binary imaginary is based on the neglect of all relational positions and
their internal conflicts and contradictions. Even though a considerable number of the
exiled signatories struggled to deconstruct this simultaneously unreal and victimizing 
imaginary during their exile experiences, as the testimonials of Interviewee 2 indicates,
there were also signatories who preferred to benefit from it at risk of reproducing this
imaginary:
I  had received an email  from a signatory academic who wanted to apply to the
PAUSE Program. She was living in a Western non-European country and sent me a
very  exciting  research  project  widely  intersecting  with  my  interest  areas.  Her
residence  permit  was  about  to  expire  in  that  country  and  she  requested  my
support, the support of the laboratory to which I am attached, for her application. I
readily supported her application and even though her application to the PAUSE
Program was rejected, I convinced my institution to open a post-doc fellowship for
her. Consequently, she got this fellowship and spent two years in our laboratory.
She  was  always  welcomed to  the  regular  meetings  of  the  laboratory  and every
colleague on my team invited her at least one time to his or her home for dinner.
But she preferred to act on her own behalf. She was generally absent from team
meetings  and  laboratory  activities.  And  we  learned  that  she  submitted  many
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applications for academic positions and fellowships during her stay without giving
us any information. For example, as a jury member I was given her application file
for  a  researcher  position  at CNRS.  […]  Among my experiences  with  threatened
scholars, her case was quite different. She got her PhD in a Western non-European
country, and she hadn’t been in Turkey for 10 years and thus her application to the
PAUSE Program was rejected. You know, there is a selection criterion in the PAUSE
Program to be in the country where the candidate is at risk in the last 3 years. She
was not in such a situation and she was not expelled from her position. I think she
was profiting of  this  to find a position in the academic field in the easiest  way
(Interviewee 2). 
60 As is seen in this case, the victimization of signatories among certain host academics
apparently render a strategy of using this victimization process for one’s own benefit
possible.  This  binary  representation  of  host-and-guest  and  victim-and-savior
relationships is, of course, somewhat reductionist; the depiction of this relationship by
Interviewee  2  includes  certain  personal  disappointment.  A  calculative  mindset  and
surrounding actions have not contradicted with academic capitalism for a long time. In
an  increasingly  shrinking  job  market  (particularly  in  the  social  sciences  and
humanities),  a  scholar  well  integrated into  academic  capitalism might  evaluate  the
behavior described by Interviewee 2 as a rational strategy of a signatory academic for
survival in this excessively competitive environment, as such a person will have few if
any chances to find a position in academia in Turkey18. 
61 This kind of survival strategy, however, should not be pursued in a stealthy way, as in
the case of the signatory described by Interviewee 2. Interviewee 1 also witnessed the
pursuit of similar strategies by threatened scholars. However, perhaps because of her
stance being more realist or her expectations of hosted scholars being more moderate,
she conceives it as a pragmatic fact that negatively affects scientific production: 
[These exiled] scholars who are good in a foreign language and familiar with French
or international scientific culture must always think about the next step. They, in
turn,  can’t  produce today,  because of  focusing on new applications to academic
positions and/or fellowships to follow the current precarious one. Worrying about
tomorrow prevents them from producing sufficiently today (Interviewee 1).
62 In most cases, the “guests” cannot be sufficiently integrated into their host institutions’
scientific activities because of the well-known ephemerality of their current positions.19
Obviously, a savior/victim relationship might lead to the reproduction of victimhood
within the context of opportunities designed only for scholars at risk, and because their
main  requirement  of  admission  is  to  be  a  victim  and/or  to  convince  the  jury  of
victimhood,  these  programs  served  for  that  purpose.  This  reproduction  process
continues during their stays: 
[…]  the  faculty  usually  approached  the  idea  of  hosting  exiled  scholars  in  their
institution from an ideological point of view. Perhaps this is a big mistake. When
you  approach  the  case  in  this  way,  you  don’t  consider  the  person  you  have
employed as your peer. This seems to me rather a humanitarian and a solidarity
behavior (Interviewee 1). 
63 The only way out of this swirl of victimhood seems to be employment by an academic
institution through the signing of a standard labor contract.  In this context,  a case
mentioned by Interviewee 1 is significant: 
For example,  we applied to the PAUSE Program for an expelled and persecuted
colleague from Turkey, but due to citizenship status our application was rejected. In
fact, he was a person really in need, and so we tried every way to ensure that he got
a lecturer position with a renewable contract. Since then, this colleague has taught
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at  our  university  and  I  can  say  he  became  completely  integrated  into  the
institution, because he was employed with ‘normal’ employee status. However, this
is not the case for other scholars hosted through the PAUSE Program (Interviewee
1). 
64 Later  in  the  interview,  she  explained  that  this  social  scientist  received  his  PhD  in
France, and even though he is more integrated into French academia, he may earn
quite  less  than  a  PAUSE  fellow.  However,  even  with  his  insufficient  income,  his
employment  status  still  provides  him  the  liberty  of  not  pursuing  subsequent
fellowships and not becoming an “academic nomad.” 
65 Drawing from Robert Castel’s works on disaffiliation (Castel, 2003, 2016)20, one can say
that employment under a precarious academic labor contract, does not fully involve
him or her in the zone of integration. Nevertheless, being part of a faculty community
no doubt provides better prospects of tenure track position. But for the majority of
exiled  scholars  this  is  not  the  case.  Their  fellowship  salaries  designed  for  “victim
academics” puts them temporarily into the zone of assistance, and after the fellowship
expiration date, at the doorstep of the zone of disaffiliation.
66 Apart from PAUSE fellows who are currently teaching or taking part in joint research
projects  in  France,  the  majority  of  exiled  signatory  scholars  are,  according  to  the
interviewees, far from being integrated into the academic field: 
PAUSE  fellow  PhD  students  tried  to  complete  their  graduate program.  Their
working order is different. But when PhD holder PAUSE fellow scholars are at stake,
I can say that if one is not very ambitious, integration is almost impossible. Rather
than working with us as workmates, they are usually stuck in a category of people
to whom we are providing humanitarian support (Interviewee 1). 
67 One obstacle before this group is language and another is their scientific discipline.
French is not a foreign language widely learned in Turkey and, when an exiled scholar
arrives in France through the PAUSE Program without sufficient French knowledge, in
most  cases  he or  she cannot  attend the scientific  activities  held at  his  or  her host
institution. As for PhD students, if they are not enrolled in an Anglophone department,
they have to spend the first couple of years of their fellowship learning French. All the
same,  PhD  students  are  relatively  more  motivated  to  learn  French  in  order  to
successfully complete their  graduate studies.  For an exiled non-Francophone senior
scholar or PhD holder, the situation is much glummer, particularly if  this person is
specialized in the social sciences or humanities. If a social scientist or humanist does
not have a graduate degree from France or another Western country and is not fluent
in at least one foreign language, he or she has very little, if any, chance to continue his
or her academic career abroad. Indeed, as most of the young holders of French PhDs
among social scientists and humanists have struggled over the years to find tenure
track  positions  in  the  increasingly  shrinking  academic  “job  market,”  there  are
obviously very few if any factors to generate motivation for them in the given situation.
68 Our interviewees clearly did not fit the “humanitarian but indifferent “host” scholar
profile  and  they  tried  to  help  exiled  signatories  integrate  into  the  academic
environment  during  their  stays.  However,  this  still  seemingly  caused  an  uneven
assister/assisted  relationship  and  related  complications.  Their  attempts  to  guide
visiting scholars have, in fact, been rejected in most cases: 
We hosted a lot of exiled scholars, not only from Turkey, but also from Syria, from
Yemen,  and  from  various  war territories.  Among  them,  only  those  who  had  a
graduate degree from France in the past could be integrated into French academia,
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because  those  people  can  be  included  into  the  network.  But  for  the  rest,  our
attempts give no results. For example, we have weekly research seminars that I’m
running in our laboratory.  Nobody among them came, including those from my
discipline. I mean, a small number of exiled scholars may be involved in scientific
activities, but the majority has no ambition to be integrated (Interviewee 1). 
69 The interviewees explain this reluctance of exiled scholars with either cultural factors
or psychological ones:
It creates a cultural shock for those who have been abroad for the first time. They
were like fish out of water. They got into a panic. Normally, they frequently applied
to us to ask for support, especially about red tape. However, I noticed that when we
gave some long-term advice to them, beyond their primary concerns, it backfired.
They were perceiving our advice as criticism and they showed an attitude of ‘who
the hell are you to counsel me’ (Interviewee 2).
70 Such  resistance  by  exiled  scholars  is  particularly  revealed  when  professional  and
academic issues come into question. The “assister” scholars apparently try to give them
advices about the functioning of academic life in French universities and the modus
operandi for surviving there, but these attempts generally come to nothing. The other
interviewee interpreted the disengagement of exiled scholars in light of their trauma
brought from Turkey:
I attribute this attitude to the trauma they experienced in their countries and their
alienation from academia. […] I think this is the main question: ‘why did all of this
happen to us and we got into this situation?’ I  observe that the impacts of this
trauma are  bigger  for  those  who come from disadvantaged backgrounds.  These
people were probably alone in terms of academic achievement in their families, and
even further, they became professors. And after the purge, they lost everything.
The suffering of this category is harder (Interviewee 1).
71 But such observations do not take into account the probability that the disengagement
of  exiled  scholars  might  be  related  to  their  unwillingness  to  be  part  of  academic
capitalism, in which, apparently,  they have very few chances to succeed. Indeed, in
spite of the steps made by AKP governments towards neoliberalization of universities
over the last two decades in Turkey, it was always possible to find certain niches free of
academic capitalism, which historically have come to be irritating splinters for both
authoritarian and neoliberal executives of higher education, and most of the signatory
academics were expelled from those niches. 
72 While the PAUSE Program’s mission has been determined, at least on paper, to expedite
“the hosting of scientists from crisis zones for sufficiently long periods to enable them
to integrate and to ensure continuity in their research,” only a small minority of exiled
scholars have been capable of moving in this direction. Consequently, according to the
interviewees, the outcome of this program is “a total washout.” (Interviewee I) Some of
those who cannot or do not want to return to Turkey are busy seeking ways of staying
in France, or another Western country, even outside of academia:
They are apparently staying here for two years just  to pass the time and learn
French. After that, instead of returning back to academia, some of them are saying
they would prefer becoming a driving teacher or opening a restaurant (Interviewee
1).
73 Some others see the PAUSE Program as an opportunity to catch their breath, away from
where they have been persecuted: 
I observe that most of the signatories who come to Western countries via PAUSE-
like programs have no conclusive goal of settling there. They are never burning
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their  bridges  with  Turkey.  I  think  that  their  priority  is  always  to  wait  for  the
persecution process to be over and then return (Interviewee 2). 
74 The scarcity of  stable long-term positions that could ensure integration in Western
academia,  especially  for  social  science  and  humanities  scholars,  increases  the
inclination  to  return  home,  especially  for  exiled  academics  from  Turkey,  whose
conditions are different compared to the conditions of war zones or those who fled
from Nazism nearly 90 years ago. Today’s exiled academics from Turkey have fled the
risk of “civic death” rather than physical death or incarceration; this particular risk
aims to confine them in the zone of disaffiliation, namely in a condition of being excluded
from both work and socialization in their country. As a discontinuous state of being
disconnected  from  “their  roots,  their  land,  their  past”  (Said  2013:  140) and,  more
importantly, from their “social ties” (Arendt 1994:116), the exile condition, which is
growing  harder  for  social  scientists  and  humanists  in  neoliberal  times  due  to  the
recession of the job market as well as average salaries, does not guarantee an escape
from the zone of  disaffiliation in the country of settlement. It  always keeps open the
possibility of turning back if there is no risk of physical persecution in the country of
origin. For governments, the tendency of exiled social science and humanities scholars
to return their countries of origin does not apparently represent a failure. Moreover,
despite the very low rates in exiled scholars’ academic integration at the end of their
stay, taking into account the political benefits of such humanitarian programs, their
outcomes  might  be  counted  in  the  success  ratio  of  countries  with  an  “imperial
university” perspective. 
 
The “New” University in Exile under Academic Capitalism 
75 The New University in Exile Consortium (NUIEC) was launched in September 2018 in
New  York  City  by  the  New  School,  which  organized,  convened,  and  provided  the
administrative base for the initiative. At the outset, the Consortium was a group of 10
US universities and colleges and has since expanded to a group of 23 higher education
institutions  in  the  US,  Germany,  Jordan  and  South  Africa.  Those  familiar  with  the
history of the New School will  remember how the institution’s first president Alvin
Johnson  opened  the  first  University  in  Exile  in  1933.  An  economist  and  journalist,
Johnson was one of the founders of the New School in 1919. Later, when Hitler rose to
power,  he  persuaded  the  institution’s  trustees  to  let  him  provide  a  safe-haven  for
refugee scholars fleeing Nazi Germany by creating a graduate school of social sciences.
Below we will compare the “original” and “new” experiences of the University in Exile,
taking into account the historical contexts from within they emerged. First, however, it
will be useful to look broadly at the differences between the NUIEC and other existing
programs  designed  to  assist  threatened  scholars,  including  the  PAUSE  Program  in
France. 
76 The scholar rescue organizations that have been working since the late 1990s prioritize
finding  host  institutions  for  such  scholars;  some  of  them  also  make  partial
contributions to the host institutions’ budget for those scholars. On the other hand, the
NUIEC prioritizes socially, intellectually, and financially supporting scholars, over the
course  of  their  stay.  In  other  words,  while  programs such as  Scholars  at  Risk,  the
Scholar  Rescue  Fund,  CARA,  and  PAUSE  focus  mainly  on  facilitating  the  “rescue”
process for threatened scholars, the NUIEC’s aim is to reduce difficulties these scholars
face during their exile. In light of Robert Castel’s aforementioned work, this approach
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appears  to  be  oriented  towards  minimizing  the  risk  of  falling  into  the  zone  of
disaffiliation for exiled scholars in their countries of settlement.
77 The source of much of the information that I rely on here is based on an interview with
the Albert and Monette Marrow Professor of Psychology Arien Mack at The New School
for Social Research. Arien Mack has been a member of the graduate faculty since 1966
and has served as the editor of Social Research since 1970, a social sciences journal that
first appeared in 1934, mainly with contributions from the faculty of the University in
Exile. Mack elaborated substantially on the project of renewing the University in Exile
in the face of burgeoning new authoritarianism of the 21st century:
I created the Journal Donation Project in 1990 with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Its
initial  aim  was  to  provide  free  largely  social  science  journal  subscriptions  to
university  libraires  in  the  former  Soviet Union  countries  which,  because  of
censorship, for the past 45 years. had not be able to obtain them. As it expanded the
project provided hundreds of subscriptions to academic journals, first in the former
Soviet Union countries and in Central European ones, like Hungary, Poland, and
Czechoslovakia.  And then we gradually extended the project to Central Asia,  to,
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirgizstan and even to Turkmenistan and to sub-Saharan
Africa,  primarily  to  Ghana  and  Nigeria.  It  became  a  hugely  effective library
assistance program. 
78 The impetus to start the New University in Exile was the imprisonment of Arien Mack’s
friend and colleague Kian Tajbakhsh, an urban planner who was twice imprisoned in
Tehran, Iran. Mack launched a campaign to free him in 2009 (“Free Kian ’09 - Campaign
to Release Dr. Kian Tajbakhsh from detention” 2009). It was this experience, which led
her to believe that the New School, a historical safe harbor for endangered scholars,
needed to be revisited: 
I wanted to do something durable and then I met the chairman of the Board of
Scholar  Rescue  Fund  which  in  2009  led  me  to  raise  the  money  to  bring  an
endangered  scholar  to  the  New  School  every  year.  The  first  scholar  was  an
Ethiopian activist  and economist.  We hosted scholars  for  8  years  and I  became
convinced that we needed to do more which was the origin of the Consortium. I
convened a series of meeting, with my colleagues, Professors Elzbieta Matynia and
Richard Bernstein and others outside the New School who worked with endangered
scholars  to  talk  about  how we could  create  a  New University  in  Exile.  I  firmly
believed the New School and in fact all universities committed to academic freedom
and human rights were morally obligated to protect threatened scholars. (interview
with Arien Mack).
79 However, first attempts of Arien Mack to resurrect the legacy of the University in Exile
had not become a high priority at the New School. After David E. Van Zandt became
president  in  2010,  the  university  launched  a  major  “rebranding”  campaign  that
stressed the “new” in the New School’s name. As Judith Friedlander notes in A Light in
Dark Times, by 2018, the New School now billed itself as a school of design with a social
purpose,  shifting  the  focus  of  the  institution  away  from  its  historic  place  among
institutions of higher learning as a champion of academic freedom and human rights,
and towards the prominent role Parsons School of Design had been playing for decades
as the financial mainstay of the university (Friedlander 2019: 350). 
80 Arien Mack’s new initiative may not have advanced Van Zandt’s dream of making the
New School more competitive in the global academic market,  but it  did attract the
enthusiastic attention of many in the wider intellectual community:
In 2016 when the UN organized a large program on the refugee crisis, the President
of  Columbia  University  at  the  suggestion  of  the  then  Ambassador  to  the  UN,
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Samantha Power, organized a public meeting about helping endangered academics
to which I was invited. It was around the time of that meeting, encouraged by the
President of Columbia who was very supportive of the idea, that I decided to move
ahead with trying to create a New University in Exile Consortium. I  did this by
writing to presidents of US universities inviting them to join us in working to form
a community for hosted exiled, endangered scholars Columbia was one of the first
universities to join followed by Yale, Brown, and Georgetown and others (interview
with Arien Mack).
81 The fact that Columbia University stepped forward right away to endorse Mack’s idea
adds a  lovely  note of  irony.  Although individual  members of  this  leading academic
institution had previously welcomed the newly arrived refugee scholars to the original
University in Exile in 1933, Columbia has a long and complicated institutional history
with the New School for Social Research that dates back to the New School’s origins, in
the days following the end of World War I. 
82 The New School was founded in 1919 as an act of protest against the leadership of
Columbia University by a group of progressive intellectuals. Charles A. Beard and James
Harvey Robinson, distinguished members of Columbia’s faculty, had resigned from the
university nearly two years before, after the trustees fired two pacifist professors for
defying  Columbia’s  president,  Nicholas  Murray  Butler,  who  had  warned  that  there
would be no tolerance for anyone on the faculty or  student body that  persisted in
campaigning against taking up arms once the United States had entered the Great War. 
83 Neither Beard, nor Robinson was a pacifist. On the contrary, they strongly supported
America’s decision to join the war, but they fiercely defended academic freedom and
therefore their colleagues’ right to voice their opinions. Beard and Robinson proudly
walked away from New York’s most renowned academic institution and, together with
other leading intellectuals  of  the day,  set  out to establish a liberal  and progressive
academic institution. They called their new educational venture the New School for
Social Research (Friedlander 2019: 3-4). 
84 As noted above, Alvin Johnson was among the founders of the New School for Social
Research. By 1922, Beard, Robinson, and many other major figures on the faculty had
given up on the project, leaving the fate of the institution in Johnson’s hands. Within a
couple  of  years,  Johnson had  turned  the  New School  into  the  nation’s  preeminent
school of continuing education for adult students, most of whom had college degrees.
As  Johnson liked  to  put  it,  the  New School  offered  a  program for  “the  continuing
education of the educated.” After his School of Continuing Education began to take off,
he dreamed of creating a more serious research program in the social sciences, but the
New  School  could  not  afford  it.  Then,  in  1933,  Hitler  rose  to  power  and  an
extraordinary group of scholars were ousted from their universities in Germany. Not
only  were  these  professors  desperately  looking  for  work  but  also,  perhaps  more
importantly,  they  wanted  to  leave  Germany  as  soon  as  possible.  In  that  context,
Johnson  could  open  the  University  in  Exile,  eventually  providing  a  safe  haven  for
nearly 200 refugee scholars,  artists,  intellectuals,  and their families within the New
School.
85 From the very beginning, IIE and Rockefeller Foundation tried to persuade Johnson to
disband the University in Exile and pool the funds he was raising with theirs, but to no
avail: 
They didn’t want Johnson competing with them by creating a University in Exile.
Their  model,  they  thought,  had  the  potential  of  helping  many  more  refugee
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scholars than his and in many more fields of inquiry, across all the disciplines. They
were not limiting themselves to the social sciences. But Johnson refused to do so.
While he was happy to help them find places for refugees in other universities, he
continued recruiting faculty to his University in Exile as well. 
What the IIE and Rockefeller had not anticipated was that other universities would
not  open  their  doors  –  at  least not  widely  enough.  In  the  end,  Johnson  alone
welcomed  more  scholars  at  the  New  School  than  did  all  the  other  American
universities combined. (Written interview with Judith Friedlander).
86 Without diminishing the accomplishments of the IIE, Rockefeller and the New School,
we must also acknowledge the fact that these institutions did not try to save every
scholar who was in need of assistance. They limited their efforts to leading figures in
their academic fields. Admittedly they did not have the funds to save everyone, but the
reality is also sobering: 
“The bar was very high.  Many were passed over for  not  being distinguished or
famous enough. Others for being too old. What do we know about the scholars who
did not receive invitations? In Well Worth Saving (2019) Laurel Leff tells the story of
the  many  other  professors  and  researchers  whose  applications  were  rejected.”
(Written interview with Judith Friedlander).
87 Interestingly, the initial doubtful positioning of these scholar rescue organizations vis-
à-vis  the  “University  in  Exile”  idea  resurfaced  85  years  later,  when  the  NUIE
Consortium project was proposed to and, once again discouraged by the IIE.
88 What is most interesting here, however, is the sharp contrast between the attitudes of
the two New School presidents 85 years apart from each other. Though it would be
wrong to neglect the ideological engagements and personality differences of the two
presidents, the major determinants in this opposition are seemingly the contexts to
which  they  have  had  to  adapt.  Unlike  today,  in the  first  half  of  the  20th century,
especially in the US,  social  sciences were regarded necessary and important.  Judith
Friedlander touches on the specificities of this context in which the New University in
Exile was founded as follows: 
Americans have never respected intellectuals – something Tocqueville noted in the
1830s – at least not to the same extent as the French and other Europeans. That
said, there have always been influential circles of intellectuals in the U.S. And New
York has served as an important center of intellectual life since the 18th century, as
Thomas Bender demonstrates in his wonderful book The New York Intellect. […] The
social sciences took root in the U.S. during the last quarter of the 19th century, but
mostly at the graduate level. They became more important in the curriculum for
liberal arts students after the crash of 1929 and the rise of fascism in Europe. […]
The founding faculty of the New School were for the most part, social scientists
with a strong interest in economics – even the historian Charles Beard focused on
economic  history.  […]  The  founders  were  so  committed  to  offering  courses  in
economics that they almost drove the New School into bankruptcy. Although the
founding faculty had difficulty accepting it, adult students in New York during the
1920s  weren’t  interested  in  studying  economics.  They  wanted  to  learn  about
psychoanalysis  and  the  arts.  This  lack  of  interest  changed  with  the  economic
collapse of 1929, at which point adult students clamored for courses on economics,
politics and society (written interview with Judith Friedlander).
89 In today’s universities  that  have been deeply embedded in the neoliberal  modes of
governance, the social sciences and humanities – except for a limited number of social
science departments focused primarily on practical professional training – no longer
represent a center of attraction. Additionally, the rescue action’s trajectory today does
no longer occur between countries with equally developed academic settings in social
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science fields, or from more developed countries to less developed ones, as was the case
in the 1930s. On the other hand, due to the ‘inflation’ of humanitarian rescue programs,
the bar of selection for rescued scholars is lower than it was 85 years ago. Hence, the
number of exiled scholars has boomed, too. Finally, the growing academic migration
following the globalization trends in the 1990s has already responded to the “need for
diversity” in faculty ranks.  In such a context,  the outcome of the NUIEC venture is
seemingly  better  than  that  of  the  PAUSE  Program  with  respect  to  keeping  exiled
scholars in the zone of assistance and as distant as possible from the zone of disaffiliation.
However, despite the efforts of its initiators and animators,  it  cannot provide them
secure employment  opportunities,  as  Alvin Johnson and other  rescue organizations
were able to do in the 1930s and 1940s. Arien Mack describes the growing difficulties
that NUIE fellow scholars are encountering with these words: 
In the United States, there are too many PhDs for very few positions. Our newly
minted PhDs end up have great difficulty finding tenure track-positions and often
frequently end up doing underpaid adjunct faculty work. Unfortunately, the exiled
scholars  must  compete  with these  young American scholars.  So,  do  I  know the
solution? No. all we can do is help and do what we can (interview with Arien Mack). 
90 Referring to Loïc Wacquant’s centaur state analogy21 to describe the neoliberal state, one
can say that rescue actions for threatened the social science and humanities scholars,
particularly  in  the  case  of  AfP,  generally  lead  to  nothing  but  migration  of  the
persecuted  scholars  from  the  authoritarian  paternalistic  body  of  the  centaur  state
towards its liberal head. In other words, the persecuted signatory social science and
humanities  scholars  in  exile  still  cannot  overcome  the  risk  of  unemployment  and
disaffiliation. With a vulture academic capitalism and a shrinking job market especially
in social sciences and humanities, the academia of the U.S. has already been based on
an  apartheid-like  functioning  to  the  detriment  of  adjunct  faculty,  of  which  the
percentage  amounted  to  73%  in  2016.  In  the  current  academic  stratification,  the
newcomer refugee scholars share inevitably the bottom rang with the young American
adjunct faculty, in addition they also have to face the challenges of being in exile.
91 The NUIE Consortium is committed to provide a community for endangered scholars.
Through weekly online seminars, wherein the persecuted scholars deliberate on the
subjects of exile, authoritarianism, or racism, the NUIEC also shows its dedication to
create  a  fruitful  intellectual  environment  for  exiled  scholars.  However,  despite  the
support  of  the  NUIEC  community,  only  those  who  already  had,  or  are  currently
enrolled  in,  PhDs  from  prestigious  American  universities,  have  had  a  chance  to
compete for full-time academic positions in exile. For the rest, who are partially in the
zone of assistance today, prospects of integration are not so different from those of the
PAUSE fellows in France. 
92 A  third  venture  outside  of  Turkey  that  this  paper  examines  is  Off-University,  an
organization  with  the  goal  of  establishing  a  relationship  with  persecuted  scholars
beyond rescue actions or exile conditions.
 
Off-University: A Tool for In Situ Resistance to Academic Repression 
93 Off-University was founded in 2017 by a group of persecuted signatory academics, who
had left Turkey in the beginning of the purge and settled in Germany. The venture aims
to  create  “new  strategies  to  uphold  and  sustain  academic  life  and  knowledge
threatened by anti-democratic and authoritarian regimes” (“Off-University - About Us”
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2017). After being established as a charitable organization according to German law, in
October 2017, Off-University had its inauguration with an online conference entitled
“Tough Questions about Peace.” Since then, it has offered a distance learning program
to meet the needs of “people from all parts of the world who have been forced to give
up their work, research or studies due to war or political persecution” (“Off-University
- About Us” 2017). The functioning of the organization can be portrayed as follows:
first,  candidates  apply  with  their  course  proposals  to  Off-University.  Then,  the
university  sends  these  proposals  to  higher  education  institutions,  which  admitted
hosting the courses and to issue participation certificates for students. Following that,
in the third step, Off-University undertakes the task of anonymously enrolling students
to these courses through a secure online platform and compensates the teaching labor
of hosted scholars with a living wage. Thus, once their course proposal is accepted,
regardless of his or her country of settlement, a persecuted jobless scholar can earn an
income  by  teaching.  This  venture,  which  was  Turkey-centered  in  terms  of  the
nationality  of  applicants  in  the  first  two  years,  has  gradually  become  more
international.  However,  this process of internationalization has not equally affected
and  transformed  the  social  sciences  and  humanities-centered  curricula,  which  is
already fragile and precarious in the face of contemporary conflicts of the faculties
under neoliberal authoritarianism. 
94 Unlike  the  rescue  organizations  concentrated  on  propagating  and  reproducing  an
unequal “savior-victim” relationship and a discourse of “victimhood,” Off-University
was established by persecuted and mostly exiled signatory scholars for those who are
trapped in Turkey as much as for themselves; some of the initiators of Off-University
face the risk of losing their current positions or residence permits in Germany in the
near future. In this respect, “solidarity” carries more weight in the vocabulary of this
initiative compared  to  terms  like  “help,”  “assist,”  or  “rescue.”  Furthermore,  the
dynamic of reciprocity between those who teach (persecuted academics) and those who
render possible and/or mediate for the secure and fair conduct of this opportunity can
hardly translate into a “patronage” relationship between parties. 
95 Julia Strutz, a human geographer, who received her PhD in 2009 with a thesis on 19th
century Istanbul and currently a postdoctoral researcher in urbanism at LMU Munich
University, described the founding process of the venture as one of the initiators of Off-
University: 
The idea of creating an initiative for showing a concrete solidarity with persecuted
colleagues  in  Turkey  came  out  while  we  were  talking  among  us  as  signatory
academics already moved to Berlin. The gist was to open online courses through
which our colleagues who fell out of work due to the academic repression might
earn income by teaching. In other words, the quest of finding a solution to a specific
problem pushed us to develop this idea. As you know, academics who were purged
with executive decrees have had no right neither to work in Turkey nor to leave it
because of the restriction over their passports. The specific problem to which we
were trying to find solutions was this. Of course, we thought also if a good thing
might come out of this disaster and if this might create an opportunity to meet
again  with  students.  In  this  process  Berlin  was  important  because  a  lot  of
persecuted signatory academics had already come to this city. But as the developers
of this idea, we knew each other from İstanbul (interview with Julia Strutz).
96 The home for the startup of this venture, as Strutz highlighted, was Berlin. The city has
apparently  been the most  attractive  for  intellectuals,  who have fled Turkey due to
political repression since the mid-2010s. In a report published by Timo Lehmann in
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Süddeutsche Zeitung, the attractiveness of Berlin for exiled intellectuals from Turkey was
depicted as follows: 
The  exiles  are  talking  about  a  ‘New  Wave’  of  Turkish  immigrants  coming  to
Germany. Though some have gone to Paris, London and New York, Berlin offers the
best  conditions  for  most  of  them:  an  international  scene,  affordable  rents,  an
already-existing Turkish cultural life, one to which they can connect” (Lehmann
2017). 
97 Moving to a new city in a foreign country, where there is already a rich cultural life
familiar with exiled scholars, most certainly reduces the risk of falling into the zone of
disaffiliation.  However,  besides  Berlin’s/Germany’s  extensive  social  opportunities
particularly  for  those  who  fled  from  Turkey,  there  are  other  factors  that  have
influenced threatened scholars’ choice of coming here, that is, the country’s will and
capacity of hosting scholars. First of all, Germany is the country with the highest rates
of academic staff employment in Europe. According to Eurostat’s Tertiary Education
Statistics, in 2017, Germany’s teaching staff numbered 407,100 while that of France was
128,200  (Eurostat  2019);  in  other  words,  the  numbers  of  academic  employment  in
Germany  was  nearly  threefold  of  its  French  counterpart,  while  the  population  of
Germany was only 1.2 times larger than that of France. Secondly, Germany was one of
the countries that demonstrated the most proactive attitudes regarding the academic
purge in Turkey. The swift establishment of the Philipp Schwartz Initiative is concrete
evidence of this attitude. The choice of names for this initiative is also important and
deserves to be briefly touched upon. Philipp Schwartz was a Hungarian-born Jewish
pathologist from Frankfurt, who “ had been accused of communist activities following
the Nazi seizure of power and suspended from his university” (Ege; Hagemann 2012:
955).  He  then  moved  to  Switzerland,  where  in  1933  he  established  the  Emergency
Assistance  Organization  for  German  Scientists  Abroad  ( Notgemeinschaft  Deutscher
Wissenschaftler im Ausland). During his work within the framework of this organization,
he met Albert Malche, who had already prepared a report about the Turkish higher
education system (specifically about the Darülfünun) and presented it to the Turkish
government in June 1932. This report provided a basis for university reform, which in
turn, as previously mentioned, provided a basis for the first academic purge in Turkey.
Thus, Philipp Schwartz played a key role as a mediator between persecuted academics
from Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia and the Turkish government, About one
hundred  scholars  purged  from their  universities  by  Nazis  and  pro-Nazis,  including
Schwartz himself, were employed at İstanbul University, an institution which, as a twist
of fate, was once the home for another some hundred purged scholars from the closed
Darülfünun, but became increasingly nationalist in the 1930s. Both Philipp Schwartz’s
memories and İzzet Behar’s examination of the correspondence between İsmet İnönü,
the  Turkish  prime  minister  of  the  time,  and  Albert  Einstein  concludes  that  in  the
recruitment of persecuted (mostly Jewish) scholars, the Turkish raison d’état was always
in  the  foreground  for  the  Turkish  government  rather  than  humanitarian  motives
(Bahar 2012: 97). As for the Turkish counterparts of these exiled scholars in İstanbul,
they were not always hospitable to their new colleagues, who were earning four times
more  than  them  and,  additionally,  were  assigned  an  assistant,  something  that  the
Turkish scholars had never had (Reisman 2007: 472). In the second half of the 2010s, the
German  government’s  choice  of  Philipp  Schwartz’s  name  for  a  fellowship  to  host
threatened  scholars,  initially  including  persecuted  scholars  from  Turkey,  was
significant  because  of  this  historical  background.  Of  course,  the  raison  d’état in  the
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background of this choice was not the same as that of the Turkish government in the
1930s.  Chatterjee  and  Maira’s  (2014) previously  mentioned  “imperial  university”
approach  seems  to  be  more  applicable  in  understanding  the  current  German
government’s  strategy.  On  the  other  hand,  the  eligibility  criteria  of  the  Philipp
Schwartz  Initiative’s  fully  funded  24-month  research  fellowships  are  substantially
aligned  with  the  German  higher  education’s  funding  model  based  on  a  certain
“excellence strategy” in force since the second part of the 2000s. That is to say, the
selection among the candidates, who must be under threat, is made according to the
candidate’s language skills, academic qualifications, potential to be integrated into the
research-related job market, etc. (see “About the Foundation” 2016). 
98 In such a competitive context, Julia Strutz highlights two important lines of tension
surfacing among exiled academics in Germany. One of them is the tension occurring
among the persecuted academics for access to funding opportunities, while the other
arises between exiled scholars with long-term research fellowships and young German
scholars with neither a tenure track position nor a long-term job contract: 
In the two first years, almost all our activities were Turkey-focused. And [this is still
the case]. The 95% of active members of the association are from Turkey. But we
have started to be transformed. On the one hand, those who came to Germany from
Turkey have today more opportunities to be included into other networks. And we
want also Off-University not to be a Turkey-focused venture. On the other hand, in
Berlin  there  is  an  increasing  competition  between  immigrant  groups.  This  is  a
disgusting thing. If you don’t work, for example, with a Syrian exiled scholar, you
are automatically a Turkish nationalist. Thus, we are making a lot of effort to work
with  other  immigrant  scholar  groups.  […]  Academics  under  risk  who  come  to
Germany with a research fellowship have two-plus-one-year contract. Any German
PhD  holder  scholar  specialized  on  the  same  topic  cannot  find  an  employment
opportunity of three years. They are working in the same department. And they
might have a silly competition between them. According to current statistics, only
4% of finished PhDs succeed in finding a permanent job in academia. For a while we
started to discuss between us whether we, as scholars under risk, are deepening or
not the existing competition in the academic field because we are a cheap labor
force. We can teach using our academic titles as professor, associate professor, etc.
We have already had experience of  teaching.  We are  interrogating whether,  by
teaching, we are making way for reducing young PhDs’ chance of competing in the
academic  job  market,  or  not.  These  questions  are  largely  discussed  between
experienced scholars who came from Turkey (interview with Julia Strutz). 
99 Strutz’s  observations  about  the  aggravated  competitiveness  among  different  exiled
scholar groups, also between exiled scholars as a whole and job-seeking young German
academics, are interesting in the context of this investigation. In the more neoliberal
funding  model  of  higher  education  based  on  “competitive  research  grants”  to  the
detriment of “government core funding” (see Jongbloed 2010), entities in the academic
field (i.e. universities, academic personnel, or students) behave in a more competitive
spirit. This education and research-funding model, which legitimates itself through a
discourse of “excellence” as a component of neoliberal meritocracy, equally applies to
fellowships for threatened scholars, apparently feeding a competitive behavior among
candidates. On the other hand, the increase in the number of this kind of fellowships
that grounds its inclusion criteria upon the material risks of political persecution and
warfare is accompanied by a sentiment of injustice among some adjunct faculty and
precarious  researchers,  who  have  already  been  subjected  to  “academic  apartheid”
(DeSantis 2011) and a growing social isolation and alienation risk. The victimization of
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fellowship-holding exiled scholars might be seen, at least for some precarious “native”
academics, as a coping mechanism so as to minimize their feelings of injustice. In such
a brutally competitive context, as in the case described above of the PAUSE Program
applicant from a Western non-European country,  we also witness the emergence of
some exiled scholars, who are at risk on paper for remotely being part of persecuted
groups but physically do live abroad, away from the immediate risk of persecution,
taking advantage of these fellowships to find relatively long-term jobs. At the same
time, we are witnessing the existence of some “native” precarious scholars, who are
apparently suspicious about the risk evaluation model of these fellowship programs
and, more broadly, are suspicious about the definition of “risk” as a whole. 
100 The difficulty about defining “risk” is equally underlined by Julia Strutz:
We can assess applications from Turkey for teaching at Off-University in respect to
the  risk.  But  when  it  comes  to  other  countries,  we  have  no  such  a  capability.
Suppose that there is a candidate from Poland, that is to say from the European
Union’s  member  country,  who  is  studying  gender  studies.  However,  he  or  she
currently has a position in a university in Poland. That is to say he or she is not
currently jobless. On the other hand, he or she has been exposed to an investigation
about  his  or  her  teaching/research  activities  or  political  activities  but  the
investigation has been closed. What can we say about whether this person is under
risk or not? […] Such cases are very complex. Additionally, the risk issue is a very
personal thing (interview with Julia Strutz). 
101 Julia  Strutz  says  that  Off-University  tries  to  resolve  this  question  by  defining  two
relatively  measurable  criteria  for  applications:  being  jobless  and  being  under
persecution. However, if there are hundreds of scholars in a similar situation, at least
on paper, as in the case of the AfP, assessing applications in terms of risk grows more
and more difficult:
The most galling thing for me, particularly during the applications, is the efforts of
some candidates to pull some strings. ‘He or she is very needy, is in an awkward
situation’ and such like… It is very annoying. Because they put me in a difficult
position. Anyway, I’m not the person to select the courses. On the other hand, I am
also aware that this manner is a part of dominant academic culture. Even so, I’m
finding it disgraceful (interview with Julia Strutz).
102 It  is  not  surprising  to  hear  that  in  the  market-like  competitive  academic  field,
networking activities – based largely on professional connections, but also on activist
ones – represent a tool for creating differences between persecuted academics to access
some positions and fellowships. Within this category, it is not hard to guess that being
in  one’s  early  career–a  weakness  in  terms of  professional  networking capacity  and
being relatively isolated from activist circles – a weakness in terms of activism-based
networking  capacity  –  would  diminish  one’s  chances  to  succeed  in  getting  certain
fellowships. 
103 In  the  case  of  the  signatory  academics,  these  inequalities  prevailed  since  the
persecution  process  first  began.  As  Aslı  Odman  underlines,  “The  price  of  being  a
signatory  of  the  peace  petition  has  been  unequally  distributed  among  signatories
through class and status cleavages. Even though the efforts of solidarity groups among
signatories  for  creating  networks  in  order  to  provide  some  material,  moral  and
mobility supports to share out the burden of this price have…somewhat succeeded,
these did not change radically this situation based on structural inequalities” (Odman
2018). 
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104 The two requirements of being jobless and being under persecution that Off-University
makes obligatory for submitting course proposals do not guarantee that class or status
inequalities will be overcome among signatories; in fact, the course proposals selected
by  academic  organizations  were  generally  taught  by  relatively  senior  persecuted
academics with a considerable amount of international academic experience. On the
other hand, among junior scholars at risk, having his or her PhD from the U.S. seems
equally to be an asset in this increasingly excellence-based competitive atmosphere. 
In Germany, we are witnessing that academic institutions want to pick up signatory
candidates having got their PhD degrees from the US. Because in Germany, like in
Turkey, a PhD from the US is an appreciated thing. And there are a lot of young
graduate students from Turkey who had signed the petition while doing their PhD
in the US. Usually there is neither investigation nor prosecution against them. But
they are nevertheless  signatories.  Are  these  people  under  risk,  really?  Actually,
these people might also be considered as academic job seekers who could not find
employment opportunity in the US. It is a debating subject between us (interview
with Julia Strutz). 
105 Excellence and risk are two key criteria for selecting endangered scholars to be funded,
and the former apparently preponderates over the latter. However, as it is mentioned
before, in the 1930s the situation was not so different regarding the prioritization of
excellence. The academic job market was significantly smaller and, consequently, only
a  few  renowned  rescued  scholars  could  find  tenured  positions  in  their  settlement
countries. But unlike the 1930s, risk, which is a subjective construction, has become
ubiquitous in today’s  society  and academia,  and this  renders  risk  evaluations more
complex and disputable. 
106 Even so, ventures launched and run by academics themselves, such as Off-University
and the New University in Exile Consortium, can create cooperative relationships with
each  other  more  easily  than  more  professionalized and  institutionalized  rescue
organizations,  which  are  managed according  to  business  principles  or  bureaucratic
administration  models.  One  cannot  create  a  dynamic  human relationship  with
employees of these latter organizations, either because they are frequently changing
due  to  the  apparently  precarious  working  conditions  or  because  they  adopt  the
principle  of  not  establishing  personal  relations  with  their  scholarship  holders.  In
contrast, academic-led ventures are always in close – and most often friendly – contact
with  fellow  scholars,  which  lets  them  evolve  in  a  dynamic  and  interactive  way.  If
academic  resistance  means  not  buckling  under  the  current  state  and  market
authoritarianism targeting predominantly social science and humanities scholars, then
creating and running such ventures might be considered as examples par excellence of
academic resistance:
We have a couple of professors with whom we have worked for a while. We are, so
to  say,  employers  of  them.  They  can  continue  their  academic  works  through
teaching at the Off-University. There are three or four academics who are teaching
continuously. But by now at least 20 persecuted academics have taught across one
or two semesters. It is not merely an issue about earning money. They can keep in
touch  with  students,  they  can  complete  their  courses  which  were  unachieved
because of the academic purge. I think it is the best side of this matter (interview
with Julia Strutz). 
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Conclusion
107 The  case  of  the  AfP  represents  a  continuum in  the  history  of  higher  education  in
modern Turkey, which has been rich in academic purges. Almost without exception,
each change in the capital accumulation regime and simultaneously in political power
led to an academic purge.  However,  the case of the AfP,  as an episode in the most
sweeping academic purge in the country’s history, has some unique characteristics in
terms of scope and scale. First of all, this most recent purge aimed to condemn targeted
academics to “civic death” as punishment. The rationale underlying this punishment,
which shows itself as a tool of necropolitics, is to confine targeted academics in the zone
of disaffiliation. On the one hand, it leaves them jobless through executive decrees that
make it essentially impossible to find new jobs, while, on the other hand, it breaks the
persecuted academics’  ties with society through a mediatic stigmatization campaign
accompanied  by  criminal  proceedings  and  wiping  out  their  basic  rights  to  express
themselves  in the public  sphere.  Secondly,  the recent  purge of  the AfP,  which was
different  in  many ways  from that  of  Gülenists,  has  manifested itself  as  a  sweeping
purge of social scientists and humanists overlapping, in this sense, with the current
transformations  of  higher  education  and  research  and  of  the  university  itself.
Correspondingly,  the purge of  the AfP makes sense within the ongoing conflicts  of
faculties under authoritarian neoliberalism. 
108 Immanuel Kant penned The Conflict of The Faculties in 1798, in order “to ground a more
comprehensive  vision  of  how  universities  should  relate  to  society  and  how  their
component faculties should interact internally” (Schapira 2019: 113). In this text, after
having defined the university as an autonomous community of learned people, Kant
talks about the conflict between the higher faculties (theology, law, and medicine, the
subjects of which are respectively the spiritual, civil, and physical well-being of people,
thus  making  them  practically  useful  for  any  government)  and  the  lower  faculties
(mainly philosophy, but equally including all natural and social sciences with subjects
of the pursuit of truth and its defense, both in the university and in society, at the cost
of  going  against  the  powerful  and  the  majority).  Without  denying  the  practical
importance of the higher faculties and the irrevocability of the conflicts inherent to
them, Kant advocates the idea that the philosophy faculty, which derives its authority
from  reason,  must  be  the  chief  pillar  for  any  university  that  intends  to  exist
autonomously and to remain relatively sheltered against interventions of governments
and  other  power  groups,  as  much  as  to  prevent  society  (and  itself,  as  a  learned
community)  from  moving  away  from  the  pursuit  of  truth  on  grounds  of  personal
interests and practical utility.  Today, the autonomy of the university as well  as the
pursuit of truth seems to be more at risk than ever before, just as is the “philosophy
faculty” at universities around the world. 
109 Authoritarian neoliberalism, predicating that the university as well as the state should
be run like a company, correspondingly evaluates the sciences (scientific disciplines)
and  their  staff  according  to  their  utility  for  both  the  market  and  the  state.
Consequently,  the authoritarian neoliberal  raison d’état considers the defense of  the
university’s autonomy to be unhelpful, and even harmful, if it does not contribute to
national interests. Likewise, market rationality sees the pursuit of truth worthless if it
does not create direct added value. Finally, in a context of post-truth politics where
emotions and beliefs  prevail  over factual  truths,  social  scientists  and even more so
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humanities  scholars  become  obviously  disposable  in  the  eyes  of  authoritarian
governments  and  university  administrations,  conquered  most  often  by  the  higher
faculties that, in contrast to the universities of Kant’s era, have been expanded with the
participation of market-friendly scientific disciplines, including some categorically put
under the label of social sciences.
110 These transformations and their various effects have come to the surface in the case of
the AfP. The massive character of this academic purge as well as the vast predominance
of social scientists and humanists among the purged signatory academics are evidence
of this fact. 
111 President Erdoğan’s statements just after the release of the peace petition clearly show
the  rationale  underlying  the  purge  of  the  AfP:  “We  face  the  betrayal  of  so-called
intellectuals who receive their salaries from the state and carry the ID, passport of this
state, while holding a higher welfare level comparing to the average of the country” (as
cited  in  Altuntaş  2016).  Following  this  statement,  the  Turkish  state  acted  like  a
paternalistic company in defiance of the constitutional rights of signatory academics,
firing some of them from both their universities and, by restricting their citizenship
rights, from the state, so to speak, which has been for some time rather an enterprise-
state  (Musso  2019).  The  arbitrary  conduct  of  the  purge  by  the  state,  namely  the
condemnation of more than 500 signatories to “civic death” without touching the rest
to the same degree, might be explained by the same transformation. Apparently, the
administration of higher education and presidents of universities behaved separately,
but in accord with one another regarding private profit and loss accounts. They carried
out  the  purge  in  a  way  that  would  not  change  Turkey’s  universities’  places  in
international rankings based on essentially quantitative indicators, while at the same
time  their  appeal  to  various  methods  of  repression  and  necropolitical  violence
paralyzed the pursuit of truth by critical social science and humanities scholars. For
these reasons,  the purge of  the AfP should not be considered as separate from the
ongoing conflict of the faculties, in which the odds are stacked against the university as
we have known it since the Humboldtian revolution. 
112 Hundreds of purged signatory social scientists and humanities scholars, who migrated
to Western countries with the assistance of humanitarian organizations, have still not
liberated themselves from the negative effects of this same conflict.  In the scholar-
migrant-receiver countries that  we have discussed here,  namely France,  the United
States, and Germany, the situation was not always better, especially for those wanting
to continue their academic career abroad. In comparison with the academic migration
of the 1930s, exiled academics today are not more competent than their counterparts in
their countries of settlement, and the existing academic institutions do not have extra
demand for newcomer social scientists and humanities scholars. On the contrary, when
this last migrant flow occurred, these institutions had already put an adjunct faculty
model into place to diminish the cost of education, especially in the social sciences and
humanities. As a result, due to the increasingly shrinking employment capacity in these
disciplines, only those who have PhDs, previous professional experience abroad, and
foreign language fluency, might be relatively – though, in most cases, temporarily –
integrated into the teaching and research staff of their host institutions, possibly at the
expense of the growing body of “native” adjunct candidates trapped in this precarious
situation. However, the great majority of exiled scholars have survived in the zone of
vulnerability by means of fellowships designed for threatened scholars, which, by their
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very  nature,  ensure the  reproduction  of  victimhood.  In  other  words,  the  work  of
humanitarian scholar rescue organizations, which are structured as a business model
and  backed  directly  or  indirectly  by  states  that  cherish  “imperial  university”
perspectives, does not generally allow exiled scholars to be integrated into academia in
their  countries  of  settlement,  but  rather  to  be  hosted  for  a  limited period of  time
abroad in purgatory. 
113 In such a context, we are witnessing the emergence of initiatives mainly launched by
academics, and usually by social scientists and humanities scholars, who are settled in
relatively  “free”  Western  countries,  in  solidarity  with  persecuted  academics  from
relatively “authoritarian” parts of the world. Off-University in Germany and the New
University in Exile Consortium (NUIEC) in the US, as described in this article, are two
examples  of  this  kind  of  initiatives.  The  NUIEC  is  concentrated  on  assisting  exiled
scholars and facilitating their integration into academia in the US. However, due to the
ongoing conflict of the faculties, in practice, the initiative does not sufficiently prevent
them  from  being  drawn  into  the  zone  of  disaffiliation.  Off-University focuses  on
providing  resources  and  opportunities  for  persecuted  unemployed  academics
regardless of their physical location. For that purpose, it functions through an online
teaching platform through which they can earn money and continue their scientific
encounters. In this sense, Off-University prioritizes supporting persecuted academics –
at  this  point,  mainly  persecuted  signatory  academics  from  Turkey  –  in  their  own
countries,  where they are exposed to academic and political  repression.  Within the
context of the ongoing conflict of the faculties, the efforts of this kind of academic-led
initiatives should also be considered for the benefit of the social sciences, humanities,
and other scientific disciplines, for which the pursuit of truth and the defense of the
idea of university have always been top priority. 
114 In  conclusion,  as  the  case  of  the  AfP  shows,  attacks  by  authoritarian  governments
against  critical  social  science  and,  humanities  scholars,  and scientists  from various
other disciplines, who are committed to the public interest instead of raison d’état or
market rationality, cannot be overcome simply by rescuing persecuted academics from
their countries. The conflict of the faculties is taking place globally; thus, the success of
the resistance in defense of the pursuit of truth and the autonomy of the university
seems to depend on a struggle carried out on the same level, in order for the actual
defeat of academic capitalism with its ultracompetitive and predatory variances. 
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NOTES
1. As  Erozan  and  Turan  stated,  in  1982,  “the  military  committee  […]  engaged  in  a  major
reorganization of the university system, […] F05BwhichF05D  would bring the universities under closer
scrutiny of the central government and to insure that the universities would no longer function
as ‘hotbeds of political radicalism’. A standard organizational model placed all universities under
the tutelage of a new central organ named the Higher Education Council” (Erozan ; Turan 2004:
360). The Higher Education Council has always been the major actor of academic repression since
then. For a recent work about the effects of the 1983 purge on intellectuals and intellectual life in
Turkey, see Ulusoy 2019.
2. Built around the Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen, the Gülen brotherhood made significant
progress following the 1980 coup d’état. Just before the July 15 incident in 2016, the Gülenists were
believed to control the state bureaucracy, especially the police, the judiciary, and the army. Their
support was of critical importance for the Justice and Development Party (AKP) between 2002
and 2010. For the history of AKP-Gülen Conflict see Taş (2018).
3. There  are  numerous  unclear  issues  regarding  the  unfolding  of  the  July  15  incident.  The
starting time of this “coup attempt” (around 7:30 pm, during Friday evening rush), ‘spectacular’
method they used (sending the military college students with a couple of tanks to the Bosphorus
Bridge in order to block the road only one direction), and “amateur” media captured attempts of
the putschists are a few to name. What is clear is that the incident -the “coup attempt” and its
failure-  has  distinct  political  consequences  on  domestic  and  foreign  policy  which  are  quite
obvious: the declaration of the state of emergency on July 20, the meeting between Erdoğan and
Putin in St.  Petersburg on August 9 while Turkey’s Western allies were keeping their silence
about the incident,  the military intervention (or invasion) of  the Turkish Armed Forces into
northeastern Syria on August 24, and the start of a sweeping purge within the state and public
institutions.  All  these  consequences  strengthen  the  idea  that  the  “coup  attempt”  was  a
premeditated reprisal by a faction within the state against one another, -if it was not a mise-en-
scene or a trap- in order to implement a more authoritarian, more Islamo-nationalist and more
irredentist regime relatively distanced from the NATO axis. 
4. After the publication of the petition (for its content, see: https://barisicinakademisyenler.net/
node/63), for example, the signatory Latife Akyüz, an assistant professor of sociology at Düzce
University, was summoned by the local prosecutor simultaneously with the suspension from her
position and harassed at home with death threats after a local newspaper published an article
calling her a traitor. The case of Ramazan Kurt, a teaching assistant of philosophy at Erzurum
Atatürk University, was similar. Almost all signatory academics working at universities located in
bastions  of  conservatism in  Turkey had to  leave their  homes from fear  of  being exposed to
physical violence or even being murdered. In addition to these locally organized attacks, a more
centralized  one  occurred  in  İstanbul  with  the  imprisonment  of  four  academics,  assistant
professors Meral Camcı (linguist), Esra Mungan (psychologist), and Muzaffer Kaya (historian) and
associate professor Kıvanç Ersoy (mathematician), after they gave a press briefing on March 10,
2016, about the attacks that signatories were exposed to and their determination of not giving up
their defense of the petition’s claims. 
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5. Based on the persecution of the AfP, 822 signatories were put on trial between October 2017
and July 2019 with the accusation of “making propaganda for a terrorist organization” (For a
detailed documentation obout the AfP case, see Acad. Peace - A Case Study Doc. Context. Instrum. Law
Turkey, 2020),
6. By the term of “academic purge” I mean the massive expulsion of academics from universities
due to their political attitudes (such as signing of a critical petition) or their affiliations (being a
member  of a  dissident  trade  union  or  a  religious  sect)  that  are  disapproved  by  central
government. Even though there is a critical difference in Turkey between dismissals without or
with decree laws in terms of loss of rights, the majority of those who were dismissed without
decree  law  has  been  equally  blacklisted  and  excluded  from  Turkey’s  academia.  Thus,  this
category also needs to be categorized as “purged academics”. 
7. When saying “allegedly Gülenist,” I do not include all academics who lost their jobs with the 15
private universities run directly or indirectly by Gülenist circles (all of which were closed) and
were afterwards blacklisted, or those who have been accused and purged with the accusation of
being Gülenist -and being part of a coup attempt- without any solid evidence. Rather, I mean
academics who adopted the faith principles and “career plans” preached by Fethullah Gülen. 
8. Even though, centre/periphery distinction is ambiguous because of the spatial and temporal
relativity of  each signifier,  tout  de même I  found significant to compare three biggest  cities
(Istanbul, Ankara and İzmir) with the rest of the country regarding the purge statistics, even
though there are few exceptional cases in both categories. I made this categorization because
Istanbul, Ankara and İzmir are distinguished from the rest of Turkey by their population (more
than 31% out of the total population), their GNP share (having a part more than 46% of the gross
national product), and the number of universities based in these cities (hosting almost 45% of all
universities).
9. Following  the  July  15  incident,  acting  or  former  rectors  of  Adnan  Menderes  University,
Akdeniz University, Celal Bayar University, Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University, Dicle University,
Dokuz Eylül University, Hacettepe University, Namık Kemal University, Pamukkale University,
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan University, Selçuk University, Uşak University, Yalova University, were
prosecuted and/or expelled from public service with the accusation of being affiliated to the
Gülen Movement. 
10. For a more detailed analysis of these “taşra üniversiteleri,” see Şengül (2014) and Özarslan
(2019).
11. That is not to say that the exposure to repression of this insignificant minority in terms of
quantity was also insignificant in terms of quality. On the contrary, this group generally suffered
more from physical and psychological violence (see Diler, 2016). 
12. Faculty Member Trainee Program of Higher Education Council remained in force between
2010  and  2016.  The  rationale  of  the  program  was  to  train  in  long-established  metropolitan
universities qualified faculty members for newly-established provincial universities in need of
academic staff. 
13. The common quality of signatories from hard and natural sciences seems to be either being
an engaged scholar in issues like public health or urbanism, or, witnessing closely what really
happened during the curfew in Kurdish provinces from July 2015 to December 2016. Even though
this group was a minority among signatories, disproportionally with their number, many of them
were highly engaged with the solidarity efforts. 
14. This  question  is  answered  by  Barış  Ünlü  with  reference  to  his  own  concept  of  the
“Turkishness contract” and the will of signatory academics to violate this contract by signing the
petition entitled “We will not be party to this crime!” (see Ünlü 2018). According to Ünlü, simply
expressing oneself  on this subject against recurring state practices might be considered as a
violation of the “contract.” I wish this interpretation were true. However, neither the content of
the petition nor the statements of academics before the Court – with a few exceptions – called
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the “Turkishness contract” into question. Rather, the objection to the war and to the violations
of  human  rights  in  Kurdish  provinces  as  well  as  the  defense  of  “the  pursuit  of  truth”  and
“academic freedom” represent the common themes of the vast majority of academics’ statements
before the Court.  Zerrin Özlem Biner’s assessment seems to me closer to reality:  “The act of
signing the petition was therefore not about a shared position with regard to the resolution of
the Kurdish conflict or about political ideas on co‐existence. It was a collective response to the
growing authoritarianism in Turkey, an ethical and political statement voicing the solidarity of
academics living predominantly outside the Kurdish region with what we knew to be happening
there” (Biner 2019: 21). 
15. Seniority, gender, social network capacity, foreign language knowledge, healthiness, wealth,
etc. have all had impacts on the ways in which purged academics dealt with the persecution. 
16. Piya Chatterjee and Sunaina Maira coined the term “imperial university” as a corollary of
imperial  and  colonial  nations’  use  of  intellectuals  and  scholarship  to  legitimize  their
“exceptionalism” as well as “expansionism” and the crucial importance of the academy’s role in
supporting state policies (Chatterjee ; Maira 2014: 6–7).
17. The  petition,  first  announced  to  the  public  with  1,128  signatories  on  January  11,  was
submitted to Parliament with 2,212 signatures in total (HRFT Academy, 2019). When the petition
was first released, 208 signatories of 1,128 (17%) were from universities abroad, and in 10 days
that number had rapidly reached 701 of 2,212 (31%).
18. It is known that not many universities in Turkey recruit signatory academics and will only do
so if the individuals have not been expelled with executive decree and consequently are not been
banned from public service. 
19. This situation is qualified by Aslı Vatansever as “a nomadic mode of living” (Vatansever 2018)
among those who are not able to return to their own countries or to settle anywhere else. 
20. According  to  Robert  Castel,  the  integration  of  individuals  in  a  society  depends  on  their
positions in relation to two axes: work and sociability. For this approach, only stable work and
strong  social  embeddedness  let  individuals  be  well  integrated.  Being  embedded  in  a  certain
sociability  without  work  eventually  pushes  them  into  the  zone  of  assistance,  whereas  having
precarious work without strong social ties drives them towards the zone of vulnerability. The lack
of both work and sociability opens pathways of disaffiliation. 
21. Loïc  Wacquant  coined  the  concept  of  “centaur  state”  to  show how neoliberalism,  as  an
ideological  and  political  program  aiming  to  create  optimal  conditions  for  the  further
accumulation of capital, and to discipline people in lower positions, combines “liberalism at the
top of class structure, and punitive paternalism at the bottom” (Wacquant 2012). 
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